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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Immigration reform has been one of the most intensely debated issues of this decade.
Years of bipartisan efforts to reform the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)
culminated in the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
Better known as the Simpson-Rodino Act, this law was hastily passed in the waning
moments of the Ninety-Ninth U.S. Congress only after adjournment had been postponed
and legislators finally reached a compromise on controversial "amnesty" provisions for
seasonal agricultural workers.
The question of immigration reform holds particular interest for the Southwestern
region of the United States because of its proximity to the porous, two-thousand-mile
boundary dividing Mexico and the United States. A majority of new immigrants, legal and
undocumented, come from Mexico. Of the 2. 1 million undocumented persons counted in
the 1980 U.S. Census, about 1.1 were Mexican and nearly half were women. Most come
seeking better economic opportunities in a country where jobs are more plentiful and
wages higher than in their own country. In actuality, Mexican immigrant labor has been an
integral part of the regional economy of the Southwest for the last one hundred years.
Recognizing the importance of immigrant workers, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed
in 1981 that "[i]llegal immigrants in considerable numbers have become productive
members of our society and are a basic part of our work force."l Yet policymakers and
interest groups often blame Mexican workers for causing such domestic problems as
economic recession and high levels of unemployment. Mexican workers have thus been
used as scapegoats in times of economic crisis and have borne the brunt of restrictive
immigration policy.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 constitutes the U.S. Congress's
answer to public outcry against the "tidal wave" of new immigrants that "endangers our
national sovereignty" and has caused the United States to "lose control of our borders."
Nativist attitudes combined with extraordinarily high estimates of the number of "illegal
aliens" in this country to prejudice public sentiment toward Mexican immigrants.
Moreover, orthodox economic and sociological theories of migration have reinforced
popular attitudes and assumptions about immigration. These negative influences are all
reflected in the legislation known as IRCA
This act represents a compromise between conflicting interests. Those favoring
restrictive immigration policy sought to impose sanctions on employers who hire
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undocumented workers. This approach is based on the assumption that employer sanctions
will stop the demand for undocumented labor and thus stop the flow of undocumented
immigrants. On the other side, agribusiness and other groups favoring immigrant labor
lobbied for provisions that would keep it available. IRCA reflects these contradictory
interests.
The contradictions inherent in IRCA make it a symbolic, unenforceable law that
promotes the status quo in migrant labor relations, allows migration to continue, and places
undocumented workers in an even more precarious position. As experts begin to study the
results of IRCA, it is becoming evident that the United States must formulate a workable,
long-term policy on Mexican immigrant labor.
Between 1985 and 2000, the Mexican economically active population will increase by
an estimated fifteen million persons. To keep these workers employed in an already
saturated job market, Mexico must create one million new jobs per year until the year 2000.
At the same time, the United States will be experiencing a labor shortage in low-entrylevel, low-skilled jobs. These trends make it imperative that the U.S. government
implement an effective bilateral approach to the question of Mexican immigrant labor.
This paper will propose an alternative policy based on a comprehensiye bilateral
agreement on the issue. Such an agreement would emphasize the legalization of Mexican
workers, unionization of immigrant workers, and grass-roots development in sending
communities. Such a policy would also facilitate the entry of workers into economic sectors
where demand exists in the United States.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Because of the multidisciplinary nature of this study, it employs an uncommon
research methodology. The underlying research is made up of three parts. The first is a
survey of the empirical literature on Mexican immigrant labor and the theoretical literature
on migration. The second part combines the findings of the first with a legal analysis of
IRCA and the forces behind its promulgation. The third part consists of interviews with
immigration experts on both sides of the border, including government officials,
academicians, organizers of immigrant workers, and immigration law practitioners. These
interviews focused on the results of IRCA and evaluations of an alternative policy
prescription designed to address the issue of Mexican immigrant workers in the United
States. The study combines legal analysis with an application of alternative migration
theory in reaching its conclusions. It does not rely on empirical data to prove that IRCA is
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not working but argues instead that mCA will not stop undocumented immigration
precisely because of the important role played by immigrant labor in maintaining the U.S.
economic system. These assertions will be supported by empirical findings.
PURPOSE OF mE STUDY
This study seeks to analyze the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 from an
alternative theoretical perspective and to propose an alternative policy on the issue of
undocumented Mexican immigrant labor. It will focus closely on IRCA and its effects on
Mexican immigrant workers. Other immigration policy issues such as political asylum for
Central American refugees and revisions of the current quota system fall outside the scope
of this paper. Although these topics are related to the subject of undocumented
immigration, they warrant separate consideration elsewhere. Similarly, this study does not
purport to address foreign-policy issues such as trade and debt. Finally, this paper will not
attempt to provide a strategy for meeting the needs of all Mexican immigrants, who come
to the United States for a variety of reasons. As noted, the central focus is on IRCA and its
effects on Mexican immigrant labor.

CHAPTER 2: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 resulted from interactions among
a complex panoply of actors representing diverse interests. This chapter will present the
social and political context underlying the debates over immigration reform and the forces
that influenced the passage of IRCA The first section will describe the influence of
orthodox social and economic theories on the prevailing U.S. perspective on immigration
reform. The second section will emphasize the historic role of Mexican labor in the United
States. It will also discuss the U.S. government's unilateral policy toward the issue of
immigration and how political elites have promoted "myths" about Mexican immigrants in
attempting to influence the political climate during the recent immigration reform debate'!
The chapter will conclude by discussing the various interest groups that lined up on
opposing sides during the debate.
THEORIES OF MIGRATION
The most popular theory of migration is equilibrium theory, which combines
conventional economic theory with the "push and pull" hypothesis on the causes of human
migration. This orthodox theory views migration as an adjustment between spatial
differences in supply and demand for labor (Portes and Walton 1981,26). Higher wages in
urban areas stimulate out-migration by individuals from the subsistence rural sector.
Migration decreases the pressure of popUlation in areas of low economic growth and
provides labor for regions of high economic growth. Labor migration thus helps restore the
balance between human capital and resources.
Modernization theorists have provided a sociological version of equilibrium theory.2
According to this version, Western-style values and forms of consumption penetrate
backward regions, producing a split between those who wish to preserve their traditional
ways and those who wish to modernize. Migration is viewed as a natural process that
restores eqUilibrium by moving the modernizing segment of the rural population to urban
centers and leaving the traditional segment behind (Portes and Walton 1981,26-27).
Both economic and sociological versions of equilibrium theory present what might be
called an "us versus them" perspective on the immigration issue. In the context of Mexican
immigration to the United States, this perspective holds that Mexicans migrate in response
to their social ills and that migration toward more job opportunities and higher wages
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provides a "safety valve" for Mexico's socioeconomic ills, for which the Mexican people are
to blame. This perspective consequently encourages a unilateral approach to policymaking in regard to a bilateral problem.
Human migration is a complex phenomenon involving numerous decisions made by
migrants at various stages of the migration process. Different theories of migration tend to
focus on one "stage" or another of the migration process, such as the causes of migration or
the adaptation of immigrants to their new environment. To understand international
migration, it is useful to examine theories of migration in terms of four stages of the
migration process: the origins of migration (or factors that cause individuals to migrate);
the stability of migrant flows; the uses of immigrant labor; and the adaptation of
immigrants to the host society. The following discussion will focus on these four stages
from an orthodox perspective)
Origins of Mi&ration
The orthodox view compiles economic, social, and political "push and pull" factors to
determine the causes of migration among individuals. It emphasizes the wage differential
in favor of receiving areas as the principal cause of labor migration. In addition to stressing
this "pull" factor, orthodox theorists view migrant flows as dependent on labor demand in
receiving areas: when demand exists, migration takes place. Thus emphasis is also placed
on the pull factors of the receiving economy (Portes and Bach 1985, 4).
This view reinforces support for legislation requiring employer sanctions. It also
legitimizes the assumption that if the receiving country penalizes employers for hiring
undocumented workers, the flow of illegal aliens will stop. Orthodox theory is flawed,
however, in its perception of the origins and causes of labor migration. First, the emphasis
on wage differentials is erroneous. If the wage gap is the main cause of immigrant labor,
one could assume that Mexican immigration would originate in the most impoverished
areas of Mexico, where the wage differential relative to the United States is most
pronounced. One could further assume that Mexican immigrant labor would originate in
poor communities closest to the U.S.-Mexican border. Studies of Mexican immigration
show, however, that immigrants historically come not from the most impoverished areas of
Mexico but from families with moderate incomes who live in Mexico's central plateau.
Immigration from urban areas and northern communities has increased only since 1970.4
Second, labor demand cannot be deemed the primary impetus of Mexican immigrant
labor if one compares the unemployment rates in the United States with levels of
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immigration since 1945. If labor demand were the determining factor, then high levels of
unemployment in the United States would stem immigrant flows. But that has not proved
to be the case. As Alejandro Portes and Robert Bach have observed, "Instead of varying
inversely with U.S. unemployment, labor immigration actually accompanied increases in
the unemployment rate in these latter years" (Portes and Bach 1985, 337).
Stability of Migration Flows in Direction and over Time
Orthodox theory views migratory flows as unidirectional: individuals migrate in
response to real or perceived differences in the standard of living between different
geographical areas. Economic or social conditions in the home country may push
individuals to move to another country in hope of obtaining a better life, causing them and
their descendants to struggle for years to attain equality in the new society. According to
this perspective, immigrants return home only because of deliberate repatriation or severe
economic depression in the receiving country (Portes and Bach 1985, 7). This
unidirectional movement supposedly continues as long as push and pull factors continue
and the receiving country permits entry.
But this view contradicts the empirical literature on common migratory patterns
among Mexican immigrants. For the most part, Mexican immigrant labor is cyclical and
demonstrates a strong orientation toward return migration. 5 Contrary to popular
perceptions, most Mexican immigrants are sojourners who stay in the United States for an
average of six to eight months. 6 Despite efforts at the federal and state levels, the United
States has not stopped the flow of Mexican immigrants, as orthodox theory predicts it
should have.
Orthodox theory nevertheless reinforces the popular belief that most Mexican
immigrants intend to settle permanently in the United States'? It also reinforces
maintenance of a unilateral policy toward immigrant labor based on the assumption that
the receiving area can stop a migrational flow once it has been institutionalized (see Portes
1983).
Uses of Immigrant Labor
In the orthodox view, immigrant labor supplements a scarce domestic labor force. 8
Initially, immigrants take the worst jobs as part of the "natural consequence of an
expanding economy" (Portes and Bach 1985, 12). Native workers meanwhile move upward
toward better-paying jobs, leaving room at the bottom for new workers. Then wages for

7

skilled and semiskilled workers tend to rise as a result of employer competition for workers
and labor scarcity at the bottom of the ladder. But these higher wages also attract
immigrants. Employers can thus seek new sources of labor as a means of controlling or
reducing wages. Over time, immigrants acquire experience and qualifications to move up
the ladder.
Critics of this perspective point out that it fails to consider economic, political, and
class relations within society.9 It also fails to account for the exploitation of immigrant
workers and offers no explanation for the numerous immigrant workers who do not move
up the occupational ladder.
Adaptation to the Host Society
The assimilation school of thought provides the conventional or orthodox view of
adaptation by immigrants to the host society. The assimilationist view defines the situation
of immigrants as "a clash between conflicting cultural values and norms" (Portes and Bach
1985, 21). Assimilation occurs through the diffusion of values and norms of the native
culture or "core" group into the immigrant "peripheral" group. Thus immigrants gradually
absorb new cultural forms that bring them closer to the majority. Assimilationists generally
consider this process of acculturation as inevitable and positive, although Portes and Bach
note that "it may take different lengths of time for different groups" (1985, 21).
Three alternatives may result from the process of assimilation in the United States:
Anglo conformity, a melting-pot situation, or cultural pluralism. Anglo conformity
represents the complete surrender of the immigrants' symbols and values and their
absorption by the core U.S. culture. The melting pot symbolizes a blend of the values,
norms, life styles, and institutions from both core and peripheral groups. Cultural
pluralism, according to Portes and Bach, "refers to a situation iIi which immigrants are able
to retain their own culture, modified by contrast with the core but still preserved in its
distinct character; each group is allowed to function on a plane of equality with limited
structural assimilation and amalgamation among them" (Portes and Bach 1985, 22).
Assimilationists disagree nevertheless about the outcomes of the assimilation process.
Portes and Bach explain that their "basic insight is that contact between new immigrants
and an established majority will lead to an eventual merging of values, symbols and
identities" (1985, 23). As noted, assimilationists view this merging as a positive process.
For the majority, it represents a guarantee of social stability as well as enrichment provided
by the elements of new cultures. For the minority, merging offers the possibility of access
to higher prestige and power and the promise of a better future for their children.
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Conversely, nativist groups like U.S. English consider cultural pluralism to be a bad
outcome. In their view, immigrants should not be allowed to exist in "cultural enclaves"
where they speak no English. Groups like U.S. English prefer Anglo conformity, or in the
alternative, the melting-pot scenario (see U.S. English 1986,214).
Regardless of individual preferences, this outline illustrates the major flaw in
orthodox theory: assimilation theory cannot explain the existence of immigrant groups that,
despite contact with the dominant society, do not eventually assimilate according to
theorists' predictions. These immigrant enclaves have minimal contact with the dominant
majority and resist assimilation. To summarize, orthodox theory views migration as a
unilateral flow of individuals responding to circumstances in the sending and receiving
countries. As Portes and Walton explain, this perspective ''views migration as an external
process occurring between two distinct spatially defined units: that which is exploited and
exports labor, and that which exploits and receives labor" (Portes and Walton 1981, 29).
This interpretation leads to the assumption that if the push or pull factors could be
eliminated, migration would cease. It also reinforces the "us versus them" perspective of
unilateral immigration policy.10 Policymakers often use orthodox theory to influence public
opinion and to provide a theoretical basis for the argument that undocumented immigrant
labor causes unemployment and poor working conditions and also burdens and threatens
American society (for a detailed discussion of this point, see White 1989, chap. 2).
Despite evidence to the contrary, government officials and private groups insist that
the presence of Mexican immigrant labor is damaging to the United States. President
Reagan summarized the government's stance toward undocumented aliens when he signed
IRCA into law. He stated that illegal immigration "is a challenge to our sovereignty" and
that "the problem of illegal immigration should not be seen as a problem between the
United States and its neighbors." He praised IRCA as "an effort to humanely regain control
of our borders and thereby preserve the value of one of the most sacred possessions of our
people: American citizenship."n
These statements clearly reflect the influence of orthodox theory in generating a
unilateral immigration policy toward undocumented Mexican immigration. In his critique
of U.S. policy on Mexican immigration, UCLA law professor Gerald LOpez has described
the U.S. government's view and popular opinion on immigration as the "informed
consensus," which is rooted in orthodox "push and pull" theory (LOpez 1981,620). He
observes that although conventional push and pull theory contains no concept of
culpability, the informed consensus on immigration assumes that Mexico ''bears the
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ultimate responsibility to keep its population at home" (L6pez 1981,621). In the final
analysis, undocumented out-migration from Mexico is "presumed to be the by-product of
Mexican policies and programs and the destination country has limited moral responsibility
for the problem" (L6pez 1981, 639). Yet as will be shown, the United States has
historically encouraged Mexican immigrant labor as a steady source of cheap labor and an
easy scapegoat for domestic social and economic problems. A review of the historic role of
Mexican labor in the United States will illustrate this ambivalent policy.
MEXICAN IMMIGRANT LABOR IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Mexican labor migration is not a recent development. U .S. labor recruiters entered
Mexico during the 1880s and 1890s, when Chinese workers were being excluded, in an
effort to replenish the dwindling work force in the Western Territories. u Recruiters
continued to import Mexican laborers to work on railroads, in mines, and in agriculture
between 1900 and 1910 (see Cardenas 1975, 73).
Indeed, the United States gave preferential treatment to Mexican workers under the
Immigration Exclusion Act of 1917 (see 39 U.S. Statutes at Large; and Calavita 1984, 135).
Under a provision allowing for the admission of temporary immigrant labor, the U.S.
Secretary of Labor exempted Mexicans from the literacy requirement, the head tax, and the
anti-contract-Iabor clause of the 1917 Immigration Act.13 This law was actually designed to
reduce the flow of Southern and Eastern European immigrants and Asians as well. But
due to a shortage of domestic labor resulting from the manpower needs of World War I,
Mexicans were allowed to work in the United States for up to six months per visit. 14
In later developments, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were exempted
from the Emergency Quota Law of 1921 (42 Statutes a! Large; see also Calavita 1984, 149).
These mostly Mexican immigrants continued to enjoy "non-quota" status under the 1924
quota law, despite opposition from organized labor (43 Statutes a! Large; Calavita 1984,
157-58).
The 1924 law created the U.S. Border Patrol, whose primary mission was to restrict
the surreptitious flow of undesirable European and Asian immigrants to coastal cities in
the East and West. But the Border Patrol profoundly affected the southern border by
creating a category of illegal immigrants out of a "pre-existing, established flow" (Portes
and Bach 1985, 77). Although Mexican workers enjoyed exemptions from immigrant
quotas, they were still subject to exclusionary provisions and visa requirements.
Consequently, many Mexican workers chose to simply bypass increasingly cumbersome
regulations and cross the border without a visa.
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In the 1930s, immigration from all countries declined sharply due to the depression

and the quota system. Between 1930 and 1940, Mexicans were laid off from their jobs and
deported en masse.15 This period marked the beginning of a cycle of encouraging Mexican
immigration in times of labor shortage then deporting Mexican workers in times of
economic or social upheaval)6 Many Americans blamed Mexican immigrants for the
economic problems of the 1930s and even deported Mexican American citizens during the
mass deportation campaigns)7 By 1940, however, an estimated one million Mexican
citizens were living in the United States (Cockcroft 1986, 62).
Mexicans saw the doors to the United States open once again during World War II,
when the United States began the bracero program in 1942 in cooperation with the
Mexican government. 18 This program allowed temporary Mexican contract workers to
cross legally into the United States. During the bracero period (1942-1964), an estimated
five million workers entered the United States. During the same period, thousands of
undocumented workers crossed the border as well. Numerous scholars have consequently
criticized the bracero program for encouraging undocumented entry and subsequent abuses
of Mexican workers (see Bustamante 1978, 194).
The bracero program represented the institutionalization of the "revolving-door"
policy on Mexican immigration: while Mexican labor is being imported, "illegals" are
simultaneously being deported. This policy has been legitimized by notions of sovereignty,
national security, and the right to control national borders.
The revolving-door policy has had far-reaching implications. First, it has exacerbated
tensions between employers and employees. The primary objective of employers is to keep
production costs down and thus allow the highest profits possible. In contrast, employees
seek higher wages, better working conditions, and job security. Undocumented workers get
caught in the middle and are used as strikebreakers to diffuse labor demands. These
competing interests played an important role in shaping the outcome of the immigration
reform debate.
Second, the revolving-door policy exposes the vulnerable position of undocumented
workers. Their "illegal" status leaves them open to exploitation and abuse by employers,
and these workers live in constant fear of deportation. As will be shown, employer abuses
could continue under IRCA, thus driving undocumented workers further "underground"
and placing them in an even more precarious position.
Finally, the revolving-door policy exemplifies the U.S. government's unilateral policy
toward Mexican immigration. The United States officially encouraged temporary Mexican
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immigrant labor until the mid-1960s. But when Mexican workers arrived in the United
States, legally or illegally, the U.S. government ignored them (see Pedraza-Bailey 1985, 1017). The result has been an ambivalent policy toward Mexican immigrant workers and a
unilateral perspective that refuses to consider the Mexican side of the migratory
phenomenon.
The 1965 and 1976 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act placed
numerical restrictions on Mexican immigration, thus reinforcing the revolving-door
approach and its inherent problems. Partly as a result of these laws, undocumented
immigration has increased dramatically since the early 1960s. In the midst of a new
"immigration crisis," the United States found that it could not stop the flow of temporary
labor that it had been actively encouraging for nearly a century.19
The "us versus them" perspective is still evident in current U.S. immigration policy.
While IRCA officially represents an effort to "humanely regain control of our borders," it
actually keeps migrant workers (especially the undocumented) intimidated, divided, and
confused. As previously noted, these policy objectives developed over more than a century
and reflect the influence of racism and xenophobia on immigration policy.20
Popular opinion on immigration issues is formed when the general public draws on
statements made by policymakers and the mass media on the subject. Studies have shown
that U.S. citizens overwhelmingly oppose the presence of undocumented immigrants in the
'United States and generally favor restrictive legislation (see Simon 1985, 44-45).
Coauthors Cafferty, Chiswick, Greeley, and Sullivan explain that the fear of immigrants is
rooted in the belief that the American political system is fragile and vulnerable to foreign
spies, criminals, and immigrants who lack democratic ideals and foster divisiveness.
Xenophobia reinforces the belief that failure to enforce immigration laws breeds cynicism,
hypocrisy, and a general disregard for the law among aliens--hence the need to "regain
control of our borders" (Cafferty et al. 1984,31).
Additional rationale for immigration reform (that is, a more restrictive immigration
law) is based on four popular assumptions: that immigrants take jobs from domestic
workers, that immigrant labor depresses wages, that immigrants place a burden on social
services, and that employer sanctions will stop the demand for undocumented labor and
thus end the flow.21 Yet the findings of recent studies indicate the contrary. Several studies
have shown that undocumented workers do not cause massive job displacement (see Flores
1983,287; Passel 1986, 195; Cockcroft 1986, 131;22 and De Freitas 1986, 7-15). Although
most undocumented workers pay federal, state, and social security taxes, they are largely
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ineligible for these benefits. 23 Other recent studies indicate that Mexican immigrants do
not depress wages for a significant portion of the American labor force. 24 In fact, some
studies indicate that undocumented workers make a net contribution to society (see
Zoldberg 1983, 3; Passel 1986, 197; Cardenas et al. 1986).
In any case, one point is clear: immigrants to the United States (legal and
undocumented) are increasing from countries all over the world.25 The growing numbers of
immigrants, combined with public pressure, led to the immigration reform debates of the
1970s and 1980s. Powerful groups lined up on opposite sides on the issue. The next section
will show how both sides played important roles in shaping the outcome of the debate and
the IRCA legislation of 1986.
THE INFLUENCE OF LABOR UNIONS, EMPLOYERS, AND INTEREST GROUPS
ON THE IMMIGRATION REFORM DEBATE
The forces behind the immigration reform debate began developing as far back as the
1850s. Since that time, diverse groups representing a wide range of interests have take
opposing sides on the immigration issue.
Labor Unions and Employers
In 1964 the bracero program was ended because of heavy opposition by organized
labor. Most labor unions have traditionally opposed immigrant labor, arguing that
immigrants push wages downward, contribute to poor working conditions, and act as
strikebreakers. 26 The primary factor in the anti-immigrant stance of early labor unions,
however, was racism. For example, the Knights of Labor, a workers' union created in 1869,
openly discriminated against Chinese and Hungarian laborers (see Santamaria G6mez
1988, 55). Organized labor continued to lobby against immigrant labor into the 1920s by
taking advantage of and even encouraging anti-immigrant sentiment and racism. 27
Despite organized labor's efforts to cut off the flow of immigrant labor during the
1920s, employers maintained strong allies in the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and
State.28 Consequently, employers succeeded in procuring Mexican contract labor under
Article 4, Proviso 9 of the 1917 immigration law. This legislation was based on a "tacit
compromise" between employers and organized labor under which Mexicans were
restricted to employment in Southwestern agriculture and "other stigmatized jobs, where
virtually no effort was being expended to organize workers or to improve working and
living conditions" (L6pez 1981, 661).
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Gilberto Cardenas has pointed out that Proviso 9 established two important
precedents: first, the proviso initiated the practice of relaxing immigrant laws when it
became desirable to import Mexican workers; second, the proviso invoked restrictive
provisions when it was deemed necessary to exclude Mexicans from immigrating on a
permanent basis (Cardenas 1975,68). Much the same strategy is still being used by
employers today.29
Employers thus achieved significant gains during the 1920s. They won other major
victories in the 1950s: in 1951, by lobbying successfully for reinstatement of the bracero
program under Public Law 78,30 then in 1952, by blocking proposed legislation establishing
employer sanctions with the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act.31
But organized labor and anti-immigrant restrictionists also achieved successes during
the 1950s. In late 1953, with the post-Korean war recession hitting hard and antiimmigrant sentiment peaking, "Operation Wetback" picked up steam. This mass
deportation campaign was aimed at undocumented immigrants, whose numbers had
increased under the bracero program. 32 In 1954 alone, the INS apprehended more than
one million undocumented Mexicans (Cockcroft 1986,39).
The "success" of Operation Wetback did not prove totally beneficial to organized
labor, however. In actuality, one factor contributing to implementation of a mass
deportation program for undocumented Mexican labor was the success of the bracero
program.33 It allowed "de jure" importation of Mexican laborers, while Operation Wetback
was mounted to stop the flow of undocumented workers, who had been motivated to enter
the United States in part because of the bracero program.
Ending the bracero program also proved to be a bittersweet victory for organized
labor. It occasioned increasing numbers of undocumented Mexicans, many of them former
braceros who later crossed the border illegally. Others took advantage of the 1965
amendments by marrying U.S. citizens whom they had met during previous visits as
braceros.34
Throughout these years of struggle between employers and labor, U.S. unions
generally viewed Mexican workers as incapable and unworthy of organization.35 In its
early years, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) barred Mexicans from membership.
Samuel Gompers, a former AFL president, told union members and the press that
"Mexicans had an inferior capacity to produce" (Cockcroft 1986,39). The AFL-CIO has
consistently been quick to blame Mexican workers during economic crises for causing
unemployment. The union has called for mass deportation of Mexicans and even for

14
sealing the border with Mexico (see Cockcroft 1986,41).36 The AFL-CIO led the
opposition against undocumented workers by lobbying for the Carter Plan for immigration
reform, which included employer sanctions (see Chapter 3).
Another important labor union, the United Farm Workers Union (UFW), which
affiliated with the AFL-CIO in 1965, has flip-flopped in its policy toward Mexican
immigrant labor. In 1974 the UFW opposed the use of immigrant labor because employers
were hiring them as strikebreakers (G6mez 1988, 135). But in 1975, the UFW embraced a
"policy of organizing all workers," documented or undocumented (G6mez 1988, 135).
Subsequently, the UFW called for apprehending and deporting undocumented
Mexicans in 1979, the same year that George Meany of the AFL-CIO demanded that the
INS intervene to stop the flow of undocumented workers (G6mez 1988, 136). Since then,
however, the UFW has changed its position again, insisting that it opposes strikebreakers,
not immigrant workers (see Cardenas 1975,88; also Sierra 1987,51). Cardenas reports
elsewhere that a significant proportion of the current UFW membership may be
undocumented workers (Cardenas 1988,96). The UFW has also opposed the restrictive
immigration policy contained in the Simpson-Rodino Act and has joined immigrant rights
groups in filing lawsuits against INS operations under IRCA.37
Other unions have openly advocated immigrant workers' rights and have successfully
organized undocumented workers. In 1978 members of the UFW broke away from the
union to form an independent union at EI Mirage, Arizona, the Arizona Farm Workers
Union (AFW). Since the late 1970s, the AFW and the Maricopa County Organizing
Project (MCOP) have successfully met the challenge of "organizing the unorganizable."38
Private Interest Groups
Minority rights groups have also joined in advocating immigrant workers' rights. One
such group, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC, the first national
organization of Mexican Americans), started out in the 1930s as an assimilationist group in
which Mexican Americans distinguished themselves from Mexicans. Although LULAC
adopted an anti-immigrant stance during the bracero period, it subsequently advocated
immigrant rights during the immigration reform debates of the 1980s (Sierra 1987,51).
LULAC lobbied against restrictive immigration legislation and has filed a lawsuit against
the INS since the passage of IRCA.39
Other minority rights groups opposing restrictive legislation include the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the Southwest Voter
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Registration Education Project (SVREP), and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).
Rather than opposing undocumented immigrants, these groups advocate the rights of
Hispanics in general (whether undocumented, citizens, or legal residents). According to
political scientist Christine Sierra, "Chicano rights groups have adopted a dual strategy of
support for the rights of undocumented workers in conjunction with protection for the
rights of Mexican American and Latino citizens and legal residents" (Sierra 1987, 49).
These groups formed a coalition with the American Civil Uberties Union (ACLU),
the National Council of Churches, and the National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship
Forum to oppose restrictive legislation. This coalition has played an important role in
counterbalancing the "informed consensus" on immigration. As Sierra observes, "Latino
activists, public officials, scholars and civil rights organizations play an increasingly
important role as 'interpreters' of the immigration issue in recent times and offer rival
interpretations of the impact of undocumented Mexican immigration" (Sierra 1987, 41).
Other groups that provide "institutionalized support" for undocumented Mexicans
include churches and private welfare agencies. Also, Ellwyn Stoddard reports that middleand upper-class families along the border often hire undocumented workers as maids and
gardeners. According to Stoddard, these families "are perhaps the strongest source of
institutionalized support for IMAs [illegal Mexican immigrants]" (Stoddard 1976, 173).
This seemingly endless list of actors in the immigration reform debate also includes
private-interest groups and scholars who have joined in advocating restrictive immigration
legislation. Some environmental groups such as the Environmental Fund and Zero
Population Growth oppose increased immigration as a threat to the quality of life in the
United States (see U.S. House Hearings 1986, 157). Such groups view immigration as
disrupting the population balance of American society. Other groups argue that Mexican
immigrants fail to assimilate into mainstream society (see U.S. English 1986). The
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) adds the argument that
undocumented immigration poses a severe drain on the economy.
FAIR cites popular opinion polls in claiming that U.S. blacks and Hispanics favor
restrictive immigration (Sierra 1987, 46). Although opinion polls show that Mexican
Americans are generally divided on the issue of undocumented workers, the majority of
those who actually voiced their opinion during the immigration reform debates did not
agree with FAIR's conclusion. According to Cardenas, among Mexican Americans who
spoke out in community meetings and forums on immigration, "the overwhelming voice was
supportive and protective of undocumented immigrants" (Cardenas 1988, 97). Another
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study of Chicano political elites from 1978 to 1980 indicates that only 22 percent of elected
and appointed officials and community leaders voiced hostile views toward undocumented
workers (de la Garza 1981, 10).
In reality, the debate over the negative impact of undocumented Mexican immigrants
on Mexican Americans seriously diverts attention from the central issue, which is the
official policy of encouraging Mexican labor migration as a temporary work force.
Cardenas summarizes this issue:
The determination of U.S. policy toward Mexicans began some 66 years ago as
a mechanism of maximizing the massive circulation of temporary Mexican workers
to the U.S. and minimizing the size and strength of the Mexican population residing
in the U.S. Again in 1983 we find the U.S. Congress and policy-makers espousing
the same anti-immigrant/anti-Mexican sentiment as they did 66 years ago, yet the
rhetoric is no longer blatantly expressed as opposition to racial type and skin color,
but, rather is now couched in opposition to culture, language, behavioral and other
aspects of behavioral assimilation with national origins (Cardenas 1988, 97).
Cardenas wrote this assessment during debate over the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation
(much the same as the Simpson-Rodino Act), which finally passed in 1986. All the actors
discussed in this chapter played significant roles in determining the final outcome of the
immigration reform debate.

CHAPTER 3: A DESCRIPTION OF IRCA
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 is based on three key assumptions:
that sanctioning employers for hiring undocumented workers will cause demand for
immigrant labor to fall (and this drop in demand for immigrant labor will stem the flow of
undocumented immigration); that sanctioning employers for hiring undocumented workers
will cause undocumented aliens in this country to return to their home country; and that if
the above assumptions hold, domestic workers will fill jobs that undocumented workers
leave behind. The first two assumptions are linked to flawed orthodox migrational theory
(as discussed in Chapter 2). The third assumption has neither a theoretical nor an
empirical basis. 1
Yet the success of IRCA depends on these orthodox assertions. This chapter will
analyze the legislation known as IRCA, its history, and its implementation with the above
assumptions in mind. This chapter will describe previous attempts made in the U.S.
Congress to legislate change in immigration policy, particularly on undocumented labor,
and will also detail the bills that led to the Simpson-Rodino Act and the major provisions in
the new law pertaining to Mexican immigrant labor. It will conclude with a discussion of
the practical problems and controversies surrounding the implementation of IRCA thus
far.
THE HISTORY OF LEGISlATION REQUIRING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND
IRCA
Congress has attempted to pass legislation providing for employer sanctions and
other immigration reforms since the early 1950s. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois proposed
to include employer sanctions in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, but a group of
Texas congressmen blocked the proposal (see Chapter 2). After several attempts to pass
employer sanctions failed in the 1970s, the issue reappeared in the early 1980s with the first
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill. 2 The avowed purpose of the companion bills was to "reform outmoded and unworkable provisions of the present immigration law and to gain control of
our national borders."3
The Senate bill passed on 17 August 1982, by a vote of eighty to nineteen. 4 But the
House did not reach a final vote on the bill because of objections to the conservative cutoff date for legalization (1 January 1980) and concern over possible discrimination against
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minorities. Agricultural groups also objected to the bill because they feared that employer
sanctions would "create havoc" in the agricultural industry (see Lungren 1987,281). It was
thus evident that agricultural interests wanted adequate provisions for importing large
numbers of foreign farmworkers.
Both bills contained revisions of the INA H-2 program created in 1952, which
provided for the entry of temporary workers in areas where a domestic shortage exists.
Workers admitted under this program are known as "H-2s" (see Chapter 2, note 28). These
new provisions were also designed to ''wean'' Southwestern growers from relying on illegal
workers (see Briggs 1986).
Senator Alan Simpson and Representative Romano Mazzoli reintroduced
immigration reform bills in the Ninety-Eighth Congress (1983-84), but the bills failed to
pass a Senate-House conference committee in October 1984. Congress once again
attempted to pass immigration reform bills in 1985. The House bill (H.R. 3080),
cosponsored by Representatives Mazzoli and Peter Rodino, and the Senate bill (S. 1200)
sponsored by Senator Simpson both focused on legalization and employer sanctions.
The original Senate bill included provisions to ease H-2 regulations and a three-year
transition period for growers. During the floor debate, Senator Pete Wilson proposed an
amendment establishing a new temporary worker program that was incorporated into the
The House bill included provisions
legislation. The bill passed on 19 September 1985.
for employer sanctions, legalization, easing H-2 regulations, and a three-year transitional
program for agriculture. The last provision was subsequently deleted. The original bill did
not include a new temporary worker program. In an effort to agree on such a program, the
House negotiated behind the scenes for ten months after the Senate passed its version of
the law. Although this kind of program was opposed by farmworkers and minority groups,
it won the support of agricultural interests (mostly from the Southwest).
The House eventually reached a compromise consisting of a "second amnesty"
program. Under the compromise, the U.S. Attorney General would grant permanent
residency status to any undocumented worker who could prove that he or she had
completed twenty days of labor in perishable crops in the United States between 1 May
1985 and 1 May 1986. In case some workers left the fields for other jobs, the agreement
provided means of "replenishing" the labor supply with additional foreign workers (see
Briggs 1986, 1004).
These provisions, known as the "Schumer Amendment," met with stiff opposition
from some House members, including Representatives Mazzoli and Lungren.
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Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Committee considered the amendment and changed the
amnesty requirement from twenty to sixty days. The bill finally passed the House after the
amnesty was extended to ninety days of work in perishable crops between 1 May 1985 and 1
May 1986. Those who qualified would be eligible for initial temporary resident status. On
completing the requirements for permanent residency, these workers would not have to
remain in agriculture and would be eligible for most social benefits.
A Senate-House conference committee hammered out the differences between both
houses and filed its report on 10 October 1986. The Senate proposals for the Wilson
temporary worker program and the agricultural transition program were dropped, but the
Schumer provisions in the House bill were retained. The House voted 238 to 173 to accept
the report on 15 October. The Senate then voted 63 to 24 on 17 October to approve the
report, and President Reagan signed the bill into law on 6 November 1986.
As noted, the Congress hastily passed the Simpson-Rodino Bill in the waning
moments of the Ninety-Ninth Congress, after adjournment had been postponed. Following
years of controversy, the United States finally had a new immigration law to deal with
undocumented aliens. Not everyone was completely satisfied with the final legislation,
however. Even Senator Simpson described the new law as "a monstrous s.o.b., ... but it
will be as sure as hell a lot better than anything we've got now" (see Langley 1988, 144).
This paper will argue instead that IRCA does not represent an improvement because it
continues to take an orthodox, unilateral approach toward Mexican immigrant labor. But
first, the new U.S. immigration law needs to be explained briefly.
THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACf OF 1986
IRCA consists of seven titles that amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.5 Titles I through III will be summarized here, with emphasis on the sections that
relate primarily to immigrant labor.
Title I: Control of Illegal Immigration
Section 101 amends the INA by adding Section 274A, which makes it illegal to
knowingly hire, recruit, or assign honorarium to aliens who are unauthorized to work in the
United States.6 Under this section, it is illegal to continue employing an unauthorized alien
if the employer becomes aware of the employee's illegal status after hire. It is also illegal
to hire unauthorized aliens as contract laborers.
IRCA does contain a grandfather clause exempting undocumented workers who were
hired prior to passage of this act. These workers may continue to work for the same
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employer. But if a worker desires to work elsewhere, he or she is required to prove work
authorization to obtain a new job.
All employers must seek proof of work authorization when hiring any new employee
after 6 November 1986.7 Each employee must attest, under penalty of perjury, to his or her
valid work authorization. Proof of the employer's examination of these documents and
proof of the employee's attestation are to be recorded on an employer's verification form
(INS Form 1-9).
Employers must keep this form for three years after hire or one year after
termination of the employee, whichever is later. The INS shall have "reasonable access" to
examine evidence of any person or entity under investigation. Sanctions include civil fines
and criminal penalties for employers who engage in a pattern or practice of employing
unauthorized aliens.8 A civil fine for the first violation can range from two hundred and
fifty dollars to two thousand dollars per individual. Fines for the second violation range
from two to five thousand dollars and for the third violation, from five to ten thousand.
Criminal penalties include a fine of up to three thousand dollars per individual or a
jail term of up to six months or both. The Attorney General may also bring a civil action to
request relief, including a permanent injunction, for the pattern or practice of hiring
unauthorized workers. An 1-9 paperwork violation carries a civil penalty of one hundred to
one thousand dollars.
Section 274A(i)(3)(A) provides an important exception for employing seasonal
agricultural workers. This section allows for deferring enforcement until 1 December 1988
for employing individuals in seasonal agricultural services. Additionally, Section
274A(i)(b) prohibits recruiting aliens to perform seasonal agricultural services except when
the recruiter "reasonably believes" that the employee meets the Labor and Agriculture
departments' determination that a labor shortage exists.
For all other employers, the sanctions took effect on 23 May 1988. IRCA provided
for an initial six-month educational period (from November 1986 through May 1987),
followed by a twelve-month "first citation period" (May 1987 through May 1988).
Title II: Legalization
Section 201 of IRCA amends the INA by adding Section 245A Better known as the
"amnesty program," this section provides temporary resident status for two categories of
immigrants: those who can prove that they entered the United States illegally prior to 1
January 1982 and have remained continuously since then, and those who can prove that
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they entered the Unites States legally but violated their legal status prior to 1 January 1982
(see subsection b of 245A). All applicants must be otherwise admissible under the
pertinent provisions of the INA9
According to this title, the U.S. Attorney General will grant work authorization to
those eligible for temporary status. These persons must file for permanent residency within
one year after completing eighteen months of continuous temporary residency. Failure to
do so will cause them to lose their temporary resident status and work authorization.
Applicants who received certain forms of public assistance after January 1982 are
ineligible for legalization. lO Those who qualify for legalization are barred from receiving
public assistance for five years.
Title III: Temporaty Agricultural Workers
Section 301 amends INA Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) by adding new provisions for
agricultural workers. It divides H-2 workers into two categories: temporary agricultural
workers (H-2A) and all other temporary workers (H-2B). There are no changes in the law
for temporary, non-agricultural workers.
Section 301(c) amends the INA by adding Section 216, which contains provisions for
admitting H-2A workers. The grower must file a petition for H-2A workers with the
Department of Labor. The Secretary of Labor will grant the petition if two conditions are
met: there is a shortage of able, willing, and qualified workers to perform the services
described in the petition; and no adverse effect on wages and working conditions will result
in similar areas.
Section 301 creates a new INA Section 210, which provides for legalizing special
agricultural workers (known as "SAWs"). Those undocumented workers who worked in
seasonal agriculture for at least ninety days between 1 May 1985 and 1 May 1986 may file
for temporary resident status. This special "amnesty" program divides applicants into two
groups. Those who worked for ninety days harvesting perishable crops in the United States
during 1984, 1985, and 1986--designated as Group I--will be given first preference on
adjusting their status to permanent residency. No more than three hundred and fifty
thousand applicants will receive Group I status. These workers can change their status to
permanent residency one year after the INS approves their application or one year after
the end of the application period, whichever is later. All other SAWs fall into Group II.
These workers may adjust their status one year after the SAWS in Group I do so. The INS
will automatically grant SAWs permanent residence after they complete the one-year
temporary residency requirement (see Interpreter Releases 66:815).
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The application period runs from 1 June 1987 to 30 November 1988. All applicants
must be admissible as immigrants. The INS, however, may waive certain grounds for
exclusion to fulfill humanitarian concerns, to assure family reunification, or to promote the
public interest.
Finally, mCA Section 301 amends the INA by creating Section 210A This section
allows for the admission of replenishment agricultural workers (known as "RAWs") if the
Secretaries of Labor and Agriculture determine that a shortage of domestic agricultural
workers exists. The secretaries of both departments must make this determination for each
year between 1990 and 1993. The number of workers admitted should equal the shortage,
if any.
RAWs must perform ninety days of seasonal agricultural services for three
consecutive years under temporary resident status. At the end of three years, they may
apply for permanent residency and leave the agricultural field if they desire.
THE IRCA AMENDMENTS AND THEIR PROBLEMATIC IMPLEMENTATION
After IRCA passed the U.S. Congress and President Reagan signed the bill into law,
it was left up to the INS to promulgate rules and regulations for carrying out the law. The
resulting INS rules and regulations have proved to be controversial. Some courts have
found that IRCA regulations contradicted congressional intent. Moreover, the
implementation of mCA has met with stiff opposition and criticism, primarily from
immigration attorneys and minority rights groups. The following section will summarize
current developments and the practical problems of implementing IRCA.
Title I: INA Section 274A
The INS issued proposed rules for employer sanctions on 16 March 1987. These rules
contained five important provisions: the 1-9 would be simplified to make record keeping
easier for employers; employers would have three days to fill out the 1-9 after a new hire;
employers would be given until 1 September 1987 to complete 1-9s for all workers hired
after 1 November 1986; the INS would create an exception for brief and casual
employment, defined as "work by individuals who provide domestic service in a private
home that is sporadic, irregular and incidental"; and the INS would create a "special rule"
for SAWs specifying that any person who intends to apply for legalization under the SAW
program does not have to present documentary evidence of work authorization until 1
September 1987. 11 All these proposed rules benefited employers, especially those in
agriculture and other industries that hire day laborers.

23
The INS issued its final rules on 4 May 1987. Employer sanctions rules remained
essentially the same as proposed, with some additional provisions: employers would have
three days to complete the 1-9, except in cases where the employee lost the documentary
evidence, in which case the employer has up to three weeks to complete the 1-9; the INS
has the authority to inspect 1-9 paperwork compliance after giving three days' advance
notice to employers; and amnesty applicants are given automatic work authorization for the
duration of the application process.12
Perhaps the most significant omission from the final rules was the failure to include a
definition of the phrase "knowingly hire." The INS declined to define it despite earlier
criticism from the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law.
When Representative Patrick Swindall asked why the proposed rules did not include a
definition of the term, INS Commissioner Alan Nelson replied that the INS felt it was
unnecessary to define "such a well-known concept" (see Interpreter Releases 64:439). This
omission may prove significant because employers could rely on the "knowingly hire"
phraseology as an affirmative defense against prosecution for hiring undocumented
workers. 13
An additional problem in effectively enforcing employer sanctions is employee fraud.
Undocumented workers reportedly can purchase fake documents to gain employment
without much difficulty (Interpreter Releases 65:883). In some cases, employers readily
accept fake documents to ''verify'' work eligibility (Cornelius 1988a, 1988b). The INS will
have to take the employer's word at face value regarding the authenticity of employees'
documents; if employers complete the 1-9 correctly, the INS would have to prove the
undocumented worker is in fact unauthorized to work in the United States. This
requirement could cause the INS to ask every employee to carry proof of work
authorization. 14
Sanctions were begun amidst considerable confusion among employers. Some
employers fired "grandfathered" employees after !RCA went into effect.15 The INS also
implemented an inconsistent policy concerning employers of domestic workers. For
example, after INS officials said that the agency would not harass persons employing
undocumented housekeepers, it fined a couple in San Benito, Texas, two hundred and fifty
dollars for having knowingly hired an illegal maid (Interpreter Releases 65:1230). Such
cases will force employers to hire workers for less than three days or for sporadic
employment, which compounds the uncertainty and job instability of employees.
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public charge" provision under Section 245A( d)(2)(B)(iii).19 This section states that an
inadmissible alien can overcome the public charge barrier by demonstrating a history of
employment in the United States or self-support without receipt of public cash assistance.
The INS attempted to replace this "special rule" by defining public cash assistance to
include money received by the alien or by family members. The court in Zambrano found
the INS interpretation to be inconsistent with the intent of the statute and ordered a
preliminary injunction enjoining the INS from applying its regulation. The court
consequently allowed an extension for affected members of the class action to apply for
amnesty. Subsequently, the INS revised its rule on public cash assistance.20
Another class action against the INS challenged the agency's construction of the
phrase "unlawful status known to the government" as meaning "known to the INS." In
Ayuda y. Meese, District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin held that the INS interpretation was
inconsistent with the statute and enjoined the INS from applying it. 21 The court ordered
the INS to notify all affected members of this class of their possible eligibility and ordered
the agency to adopt measures to ease the requirements.
In a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, LULAC y. INS, the plaintiffs challenged the
INS policy of denying amnesty to otherwise qualified aliens who had reentered the United
States after 1 January 1982 with nonimmigrant visas or other forms of documentation that,
according to the INS, ''break the chain of continuous unlawful residence."22 On 8 October
1987, the INS reversed its policy and announced that those who reentered on
nonimmigrant visas but intended to remain permanently in the United States had
reentered by means of a fraudulent act and thus must apply for a waiver of inadmissibility
for fraud.
Another case from the Ninth Circuit has resulted in an extension of amnesty for
affected applicants. In Catholic Social Services y. Meese, the plaintiffs challenged the
INS's definition of ''brief, casual and innocent" absences from the United States. 23 The INS
interpreted such absences as requiring advanced parole, that is, a departure from the
United States authorized in advance by the INS. The court held that the INS interpretation
was inconsistent with congressional intent to implement amnesty provisions in a "liberal
and generous fashion" and gave potential applicants until 30 November 1988 to apply for
amnesty.24
All these cases illustrate the problems inherent in the legalization provisions
promulgated by the INS. Some professional groups, like the Association of Immigration
Law Attorneys (AILA), blamed the confusion and "snags" in the legalization program on
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the INS for delaying rules and regulations (the INS published its final rules on 4 May 1987,
just one day prior to the start of the amnesty application period). The INS, in turn,
adopted procedures designed to implement the program in a smoother fashion.
Nevertheless, fewer people filed applications for legalization than expected. Because
of the cases filed by Ayuda, LUlAC, and Catholic Social Services, it is too early to
determine the final results of first-phase temporary amnesty. By 20 January 1989, almost
1.2 million persons had filed amnesty applications. At the end of the application period,
1.7 million persons had applied. As of February 1989, the INS had approved 1,236,609
applications and denied 33,585, an approval rate of 97 percent (see Interpreter Releases
64: 1255-56).
Applicants who are approved by the INS must complete the second phase of the
amnesty process by applying for and gaining permanent residency within thirty months after
being approved for temporary amnesty. The INS released its rules for completing the
second phase on 31 October 1988 (see Interpreter Releases 65:75). The INS will accept
applications for permanent residency by mail at INS regional processing facilities beginning
7 November 1988. Each application must be accompanied by a fee of eighty dollars per
person or two hundred and forty dollars per family. Applicants who filed for temporary
amnesty before 1 December 1987 must submit current results of a medical examination for
AIDS. All applicants must be interviewed by INS officials and must demonstrate
knowledge and proficiency in English and U.S. civics.25
It is too soon to tell how many applicants will pass the second-phase regulations.
Nevertheless, immigrant rights groups have already attacked INS rules on the second phase
on the grounds that INS notice to temporary amnesty recipients was misleading (see
Interpreter Releases 66:64).
Title Ill: Section 210 (SAWs) and 210A (RAWs)
Although the INS has applied strict interpretations to Title II provisions, it has
granted considerably more flexibility and latitude to SAW applicants. For example, the
omnibus spending bill of 1987 contained a compromise allowing for notice to all deportees
of the opportunity to apply for SAW legalization (see Interpreter Releases 65:2). Those
deportees who may be eligible are allowed to reenter the United States at designated ports
of entry located along the Mexican border at Calexico, Otay Mesa, and Laredo. Workers
entering at these locations may file a SAW application without the normally required
documentary evidence of performance of ninety days' labor in agricultural services (see
Interpreter Releases 65:2).
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The bill also eliminates the proposed cut-off dates for reentry into the United States.
Thus SAW applicants may reenter the United States during the application period and
apply for SAW legalization, contrary to Title TI, which requires illegal residence in the
United States prior to 1982. These provisions facilitate SAW applications, bona fide as
well as fraudulent, and encourage widespread participation in the SAW program.
Nevertheless, the SAW program has generated a considerable amount of confusion and
contradictions in policy.
Most of the confusion over the SAW program stems from the Secretary of
Agriculture's interpretation of perishable commodities.26 The USDA list of such
commodities includes Christmas trees, sugar beets, and hay but excludes sugarcane and sod
(see Interpreter Releases 65:841). Meanwhile, the USDA has categorized cotton as a fruit,
thus allowing cotton pickers to apply for the SAW program (see Interpreter Releases
65:841). In the cases of cotton and hay, these contradictory interpretations have resulted
from lawsuits challenging the omission of these crops from the list of perishable
commodities. 27
Other lawsuits are challenging the INS policies of implementing Title TIl. The
Arizona Farmworkers Union challenged the INS policy of denying employment
authorization to H-2A immigrants who file nonfrivolous SAW applications. 28 These
applicants are now being granted work authorizations.
A similar suit was filed by the United Farmworkers Union challenging the INS
practice of denying SAW applications in cases where the employer refuses to provide
crucial documentary evidence in support of the applicant.29 The INS has since amended its
rules to require the agency to attempt to secure the employment records of SAW
applicants who allege that employers or farm labor contractors are refusing to provide
employment records. 30
The UFW case also challenges the INS practice of denying SAW applications where
applicants rely on corroborative evidence like affidavits to prove eligibility. The court
denied a preliminary injunction against the INS in the United Farmworkers case (see
Interpreter Releases 65:506-7). The parties have since reached an agreement whereby the
INS will abandon the practice of denying applications based only on corroborative
evidence. Conversely, an Eleventh Circuit court granted a preliminary injunction on the
same question in the case of the Haitian Refu~ee Center y. Nelson. 31 Although this ruling
applies only in the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit, it provides advocates for
farmworkers with an important victory against INS policy. Some advocates are currently
organizing a nationwide class action against the INS on the same issue.
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Despite these problems, liberal SAW regulations encouraged more SAW applications
than expected. By the application deadline of 30 November 1988, some 1.1 million persons
had applied for SAW status. Eighty-four percent of the applicants are from Mexico, with
more than one-half of the applications filed in California, 10 percent in Florida, and 8
percent in Texas (see Interpreter Releases 65:1255-56). Applications are still awaiting
approval, and lawsuits are still pending against the INS on SAW provisions. For example,
one lawsuit filed in California charges the U.S. Border Patrol from Texas to California with
wrongfully seizing documents from SAW applicants and coercing them into withdrawing
the application or signing a "confession" admitting that they fraudulently applied for
amnesty.32
CONCLUSION
The obvious flaw in the IRCA legislation is its assumption that employer sanctions
will stop the demand for undocumented workers and thus stop undocumented immigrant
flows. The evidence thus far has proved otherwise (see Chapter 4). But the law contains
other shortcomings stemming from inherent contradictions. For example, the legalization
program directly contradicts orthodox theory. While orthodox theory assumes that the
receiving country can stop the flow of immigrant labor, the "amnesty" program continues to
provide employers with a pool of relatively powerless temporary resident workers. The
SAW program exacerbates this contradiction by increasing the pool of temporary workers
in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the RAW program guarantees the continued flow of
temporary immigrant workers in agriculture if SAWs move to other occupations.
In sum, numerous practical problems have arisen in implementing IRCA Loopholes
in the employer sanctions legislation make Section 274A an ineffective and unenforceable
law that encourages employment of undocumented workers on a temporary basis. Many
potential applicants did not apply for legalization or were discouraged from completing the
application process. Those who gained temporary residency must complete the second
phase of the legalization program or lose their legal status. In contrast, SAW applicants
are given preferential treatment. The easier burden on SAWs illustrates how the legal
system adjusts its procedures to accommodate employers' need for a reserve pool of labor
in the United States.

CHAPTER 4: A CRITIQUE OF IRCA
This chapter will assess IRCA from an alternative theoretical perspective that
emphasizes the role of Mexican immigrant labor in the U.S. economy and the role of the
state in regulating immigrant labor. Although orthodox theorists do not incorporate the
state into their theories, in actuality it plays a contradictory role: the U.S. government must
control the flow of immigrant labor while simultaneously providing U.S. businesses with a
steady supply of immigrant labor. This contradictory role is built into IRCA, which
seemingly attempts to stop undocumented migration while permitting the continued flow of
immigrant labor. IRCA enables the state to perform the latter function by means of
loopholes in employer sanctions provisions, a misleading "amnesty" program, and legal
provisions designed to facilitate the use of immigrant labor in agriculture.
ALTERNATIVE MIGRATION THEORY
Another approach to migration emphasizes world-system and articulation theories,
which were developed in the past decade or so out of neo-Marxist thinking on the
development of modern societies.
According to the world-system view, migration occurs not as an external process
between two separate entities (as orthodox theory suggests) but as part of the internal
dynamics of the global capitalist system. Centers of the system control peripheral areas
through financial and trade mechanisms. The goal of the system is maximization of surplus
in the core, and the net result has been characterized as "an ever growing articulation and
interdependence between the different economic units of the global system" (Portes and
Walton 1981, 29).
Articulationists take this approach one step further by positing that noncapitalist
modes of production exist in articulation with dominant capitalist modes of production to
supply the dominant sector with a reserve pool of labor. Noncapitalist modes also provide
a mechanism of subsistence production through which workers can generate part of their
subsistence costs outside the wage sector, thereby allowing them to survive on a lower wage
than would otherwise be necessary for their economic survival. 1
Just as orthodox theories do not encompass the process of migration in all its stages
(for example, equilibrium theory confines itself to the origins and uses of migrant labor
while assimilation theory focuses on immigrants' adaptation to the host society), various
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alternative theories also limit themselves to certain aspects or stages of the migration
process. World-system theory describes the origins and stability of migrant flows. Splitlabor-market and dual-economy theories explain the uses of immigrant labor. Internalcolonialist theory provides an alternative view of immigrants' adaptation to the host society.
Finally, articulationists explain the role of workers in noncapitalist sectors of the economy,
such as subsistence farmers and street vendors. The next section will discuss the four
"stages" of migration in terms of each theory and specify its contributions to an alternative
perspective on labor migration.
Origins of Mi&ration
World-system theory explains labor migration as originating in the gradual
penetration by the world capitalist economy into lesser developed countries. Penetration
produces imbalances in the internal social and economic structure of the peripheral
country.2 According to this theory, migration represents a solution to internal problems
that are actually induced by the expansion of the global capitalist system (see Portes and
Bach 1985, 7).
Rapid-demand industrialization and technical improvements in the United States
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a pronounced need for
foreign labor. Additionally, declining profits generated a need for cheap labor to offset the
victories of organized labor. As the drive for accumulation and expanded markets and
resources pushed capitalist penetration westward in the United States, Mexican labor
became the most attractive source of immigrant labor in what is now the southwestern
United States (see Sassen-Koob 1981,56, n. 2).
In contrast to world-system theory, the articulation approach to development argues
that the capitalist system has not entirely penetrated peripheral regions of the world. This
approach analyzes the transition or lack of transition of traditional economies into the
capitalist system. David Goodman and Michael Reddift describe the premises of the
articulation approach: "peripheral social formations are constituted by the articulated
combination of the dominant mode of production and the subordinate, non-capitalist
modes of production. The persistence of these modes in articulation with capitalism
'blocks' the expansion of capitalist production relations, and full development of the
productive forces ... is impaired" (Goodman and Reddift 1982,56). Thus noncapitalist
economies, such as peasant subsistence agricultural economies, exist jointly and
interrelatedly with the capitalist system. The conditions of human reproduction, however,
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are viewed as existing independently of the capitalist system. In other words, noncapitalist
economies assume the costs of raising, clothing, feeding, and educating children.
Meilassoux adds that articulation is necessary to counteract the declining rate of
profit and to provide access to cheap labor power. He observes that under certain
conditions, articulation is structured to maintain precapitalist modes of production that act
as "reservoirs" of cheap labor for capitalist sectors of the economy: "With seasonal or
migrant labor, part of the long-term costs of production are borne by the pre-capitalist
sector or domestic community and the wage paid by capital is correspondingly lower"
(Meilassoux 1972).
Stability and Direction of Migration Flows
According to world-system theory, migration serves a dual function: "From the
standpoint of capital, it is the means to fulfill labor demands at different [spatial] points of
the system; from the standpoint of labor, it is the means to take advantage of opportunities
distributed unequally in space" (Portes and Bach 1985,9). Migrational networks thus link
peripheral areas to center areas. Networks also help ensure the early survival of new
migrants and assist in finding new jobs. According to Portes and Bach, "labor migration
can thus be conceptualized as a process of network building, which depends on and, in turn,
reinforces social relationships across space" (1985, 10). Migrant flows do not respond
automatically to changes in push and pull forces. On the contrary, the resilience of migrant
networks defies changes in push and pull factors.
Uses of Immigrant Labor
Orthodox theory views the use of immigrant labor as purely supplemental to a scarce
domestic labor force, but alternative theories focus on differences in class and race. The
split-Iabor- market theory perceives the use of immigrant labor as a strategy used by the
employer class against the organizational efforts of citizen workers. Immigrant workers are
used as strikebreakers and as a means of keeping labor costs down, and they consequently
benefit only employers, not society as a whole. The position of these workers is weaker
than citizen workers vis-a.-vis employers for a variety of reasons. Immigrants must deal with
linguistic and cultural barriers, including racial prejudice. Conditions in the home country
may leave immigrants no choice but to accept the demands of employers. Moreover, legal
constraints make undocumented workers vulnerable to employers and governmental
authorities (Portes and Bach 1985, 16).
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The dual-economy thesis provides an additional perspective on the use of immigrant
labor. According to this theory, powerful oligopolies form the primary segment of the
economy in the industrialized capitalist countries3 and rely on capital-intensive technology
to reduce labor costs and demand. Because of their size, these large firms succeed in
creating internal job markets. They can compensate for increases in labor costs with
increases in productivity or higher prices or both. Labor entry usually occurs at the bottom
of the job ladder, with higher wages and increases in pay and status providing incentives for
workers to remain in a particular firm (Portes and Bach 1985, 17).
Smaller competitive firms form the secondary segment of the economy. Functioning
in an environment of uncertainty, competitive firms operate in local or regional markets
and cannot pass higher labor costs on to consumers. They often rely on labor-intensive
processes of production and suffer a high rate of turnover. Portes and Bach conclude that
"for competitive capital, the viability of these relationships [of production] depends on the
presence of a labor force that is both abundant and powerless" (Portes and Bach 1985, 18).
Thus competitive firms rely primarily on immigrant and minority labor.
The relatively advantaged position of workers in the primary sector reflects earlier
class struggles and eventual accommodation through which organized labor gained its
present advantages and security while firms gained control over the work process in a
manner that promoted stability and minimal disturbances (Portes and Bach 1985, 19). But
as the availability of jobs in the primary sector began to decrease after the New Deal and
World War II, smaller competitive firms began to hire less-organized minority workers.
Portes and Bach have noted an increasing reliance among secondary firms on
undocumented immigrant labor. This increase "coincides with the exhaustion of certain
labor sources--teenagers and rural migrants--and the increasing resistance of workers to
accept employment in these firms" (Portes and Bach 1985, 19).
The split-labor-market and dual-economy theories both have their drawbacks. First,
split-labor-market theory views immigrant labor as benefiting only employers. Yet studies
indicate that even undocumented workers benefit society as a whole through their taxes
and contributions to social security (see Chapter 2, notes 37-38). Second, not all immigrant
workers are stuck in secondary, competitive firms. Some immigrant workers pierce the
"barriers of entry" in the primary segment of the dual-economy model.
Despite these drawbacks, split-labor-market and dual-economy theories are more
convincing than orthodox theory because they do not make the empirically inaccurate claim
(commonly made by restrictionists) that native workers will fill jobs left by undocumented
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workers because of employer sanctions. There is no evidence that native workers take jobs
left vacant by undocumented workers (see Cornelius 1988a). Thus the expectation of
lowering domestic unemployment through employer sanctions is empirically flawed.
These other theories also explain the use of undocumented labor for the purpose of
controlling the labor force. According to split-labor-market analysis, employers hire
undocumented workers as strikebreakers to diminish organized labor's power. According
to the dual-economy model, if immigrant labor displaces national labor at all, it is in
secondary firms where workers are largely minority and unorganized. The use of
immigrant labor consequently renders the work force powerless and increases employers'
control (see Chapter 5, note 11).
Articulationists provide an additional interpretation of the uses of immigrant labor.
In the articulation view, noncapitalist modes of production are maintained to provide a
reservoir of cheap labor for capitalist sectors of the economy and a subsidy for the working
proletariat and capitalists in the form of subsistence production. The noncapitalist mode
bears the long-term costs of reproduction (that is, of raising children to be workers), and
therefore wages paid by the capitalist sector can be correspondingly lower. Partly because
of these reasons, employers prefer immigrant labor.
Adaptation to Host Society
While assimilation theory holds that immigrant groups will eventually blend into the
mainstream society, an alternative view holds that contact with the dominant majority can
have the opposite effect. According to John Stone, minority immigrant groups "learn their
true economic position" through contact with the majority and "are exposed to racist
ideologies directed against them as instruments of domination" (Stone 1985, 113). Drawing
on an internal colonialist model, this view offers an explanation for the existence of
immigrant groups that, despite having learned the dominant language and become
thoroughly familiar with the majority's values and lifestyles, still cling to their cultural
identity and resist further assimilation. According to this perspective, structural factors like
racism prohibit the complete assimilation of immigrant ethnic groups. The purpose of this
continued segregation is to maintain a reserve pool of surplus labor.
Summary
As evidenced by articulation theory, individuals in the Mexican economy who subsist
outside capitalist modes of production play an important role in the migration process.
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Subsistence farmers and members of the informal sector supply capitalist sectors of the
economy with a reserve pool of cheap labor' and a subsidy in the form of subsistence
reproduction. In the context of Mexican immigrant labor, these individuals serve the same
purpose for U.S. employers when job opportunities or other means of survival diminish in
Mexico. This perspective illuminates the intent of the legalization, SAW, and RAW
programs: to provide U.S. employers with a reserve pool of cheap immigrant labor and a
subsidized labor force.
The world-system perspective make possible an alternative analysis of the provisions
for employer sanctions. Mexican immigrant labor results from imbalances in the economy
caused by the penetration of capitalism in Mexico. As long as those imbalances persist, no
law will be able to stop Mexican immigrant labor (see Rogers 1985, 188; Larsen 1989, 1415).
The dual-economy and split-labor-market theories illustrate methods of retaining
control over the work force. Because these theories do not consider immigrant labor as
supplemental to the national work force, they also do not support the assumption that
increased immigration will have an inverse effect on citizen unemployment levels.
The internal colonial model explains the presence of immigrant groups that are fully
exposed to the dominant culture but continue to resist assimilation. For these groups,
ethnic solidarity provides the means of living outside the mainstream of society with no
need or desire to assimilate.
Francisco Alba has summarized the alternative perspective on Mexican immigrant
labor: "Migration from Mexico to the United States forms part of a worldwide flow in
which labor resources are drawn to highly developed countries from the underdeveloped
ones. Immigration in its various forms to advanced industrial economies is not a temporary
phenomenon, but is a structural element connected with the maintenance of the system
itself' (Alba 1978, 509). Alba adds that the United States needs immigrant labor to
maintain its economic system. The availability of an international labor reserve makes it
possible to import workers when necessary and export them when they become redundant
(Alba 1978, 509).
Also employing this perspective, Jorge Bustamante refers to Mexican immigrant
labor as "commodity migrants." He asserts that these immigrant workers share the
following characteristics: they occupy the lowest-paying positions of society's occupational
structure; they are socially defined as deviants and sanctioned through prejudice and
discrimination; they are cast into conflict with the lowest-paid native workers and become a
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means of preventing solidarity among workers; and in times of crisis, they are used as
scapegoats for allegedly causing social, economic, and political problems, thus displacing
the dominant group's responsibility and preventing structural change (Bustamante 1978,
185-86).
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF MEXICAN-U.S. IMMIGRATION
One of IRCA's major flaws is its failure to address the Mexican perspective on
emigration to the United States. Discussing this issue from the other side of the border
highlights both the inadequacies of IRCA and the accuracy of the basic assumptions of
alternative theory.
The Mexican government historically has taken an ambivalent position on the subject
of emigration to the United States, recognizing that it provides an "escape valve" for
domestic ills. Indeed, Mexico does benefit from out-migration because labor migration to
the United States releases some pressure from overpopulation and unemployment. More
important, Mexico receives an estimated one billion dollars per year in remittances from its
workers in the United States (see Cockcroft 1986, 84). These benefits also entail certain
costs, however.
The highest cost of emigration is the loss of human resources and capital. More and
more educated Mexicans are migrating to the United States. Whole families are migrating
more frequently, and more migrants are staying in the United States on a permanent basis
(see Cornelius 1988b, 13; Briody 1987,44). Mexico now perceives what was once
considered an "escape valve" as a drain on its human resources. In fact, one Mexican
senator declared in 1985 that emigration was an obstacle to growth in Mexico (see
Bustamante 1988, 120). This change in the Mexican perspective warrants further
consideration.
The conditions that motivate migration from Mexico to the United States have been
developing for over a century. Raul Fernandez lists three factors that influenced the onset
of Mexican migration to the United States: the commercialization of the agrarian sector
during the Porfiriato (1886-1911); the penetration of railroads into Mexico's interior, which
facilitated the recruiting and transporting of immigrant labor during same period; and the
Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Fernandez 1977, 97-98).
Alba observes that Mexico's developmental strategy and the spread of U.S. styles of
consumption and culture have become primary factors in modern-day out-migration from
Mexico (Alba 1978, 504). Since 1940 Mexico's strategy of import-substitution
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industrialization (lSI) has coincided with the dislocation of the rural population and the
redistribution of farmlands. The use of capital-intensive technology in Mexico's
industrialization program has limited the number of manufacturing jobs available for the
displaced rural population, thereby swelling the ranks of a reserve army of labor lacking
jobs or sufficient income. 5 Other negative consequences of lSI include scientific and
technological dependency on advanced core nations, a huge foreign debt and a balance of
payments deficit, concentration of domestic income, and regional imbalances in population
and resources (see Alba 1978, 504).6 Alba concludes that the penetration of modem styles
of consumption and U.S. culture, combined with Mexico's attempt to emulate
modernization and developmental patterns of advanced industrialized countries, has
resulted in marginalizing a significant portion of the popUlation.? For many Mexicans,
emigration has become the only alternative.
In addition to its lSI policy, Mexico promoted capitalist agriculture between 1940 and
1960. The government reversed previous policies that had promoted agrarian technology
and financial supports, resulting in the "recreation" of a landless proletariat (see Isaac 1987,
5). Rural reforms of the early 1970s calmed political unrest in the countryside but did little
to absorb the landless rural labor force. Subsequently, the L6pez Portillo administration
(1976-1982) rejected rural reform strategies and promoted an economic development
policy based on agricultural export earnings and internal industrial development. These
policies increased internal migration as well as emigration to the United States while
adding to the crisis in agricultural production. During this period, emigration provided a
vent for growing rural militancy and unrest (Isaac 1987, 6).
Foreign economic influences may also have contributed to the migration flow. For
example, Mexico's Border Industrialization Program, particularly the maquiladoras, may
have stimulated migration from the interior to the border cities. These migrants may then
"become prime candidates for illegal immigration when they are unable to obtain jobs on
the Mexican side of the border" (Rogers 1985, 163-64).
James Cockcroft adds that Mexico's current crisis is directly related to the U.S.
economic recessions of 1973-1975 and 1981-1983. He describes the interdependence of the
two countries' economic systems: "Because of the States's role in Mexico's industrial and
agrarian transformation, and because of increased domination by domestic and foreign
monopolies, Mexico's economic system can be characterized as dependent, state-guided
monopoly capitalism. U.S. capital does not control Mexico's economy, but it wields
sufficient influence to make a critical difference, and therein lies Mexico's economic
dependence" (Cockcroft 1986, 105).
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While Cockcroft may overstate Mexico's dependency, its economy is undoubtedly tied
to the global capitalist system. A global recession cuts Mexico off not only from primary
U.S. markets but from alternative markets as well. Indeed, in the middle of the global
recession between 1981 and 1983, Mexico erupted in financial crisis. The peso was
devalued to less than one-tenth of its previous value relative to the dollar in 1976; capital
flight increased at an alarming rate; thousands of workers were laid off; and numerous
small business and farms closed.8 These factors contributed to unemployment and in turn
increased immigration. The peso devaluation also helped spur undocumented immigration
in the 1980s by increasing the wage differential between the two countries (see Gregory
1986, 274).
As the current economic crisis in Mexico deepens, emigration continues despite
efforts in the United States to stop the flow. The Mexican economy has not grown in six
years, and the annual inflation rate in 1987 reached at 159 percent, although it fell to 40
percent in 1988.9 Some 52 percent of the Mexican work force was underemployed in 1982;
by 1988 five million Mexicans were unemployed (Cockcroft 1986, 129).10 In 1982 individual
income in Mexico averaged thirty-one hundred dollars per year, compared with more than
twelve thousand in the United States (Chiswick 1986,93). Mexican wages lost half their
value between 1983 and 1988. 11
Consequently, one of the most pressing challenges for the new administration of
Carlos Salinas de Gortari is to provide economic growth while servicing Mexico's foreign
debt of 106 billion dollars. 12 Additionally, Mexico will have to provide some one million
jobs annually until the year 2000 just to absorb its youthful entrants into the labor force.13
In 1984 Mexico's population reached seventy-eight million people (Chiswick 1986, 93), and
experts predict that the population will double by the year 2010. Moreover, nearly half of
Mexico's population is under fifteen years 01d.14 Thus an estimated fifteen million young
persons will enter the Mexican labor market at a rate of one million per year between 1984
and 2000 (see Casteneda 1986, 123).15
Meanwhile, the United States will begin to experience a shortage of young workers
entering the labor market by the year 2000 (see Fullerton 1987).16 While low-skilled, lowentry-level jobs are becoming more prevalent, U.S. youth are increasingly shunning such
jobs because of low wages and the availability of social services (see Cornelius 1988a, 7;
1988b). Clark Reynolds has predicted that the United States will need an estimated five
million foreign workers in the labor force (about four hundred thousand per year) by the
year 2000 just to maintain a growth rate of 3 per cent (see Gregory 1986,203).
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These figures underscore the social conditions motivating Mexican workers to
migrate to the United States and the need for immigrant workers in the core country. The
result is a large pool of reserve labor at the U.S. border, with the core country having the
ultimate task of regulating the flow.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
According to Saskia Sassen-Koob, intemationallabor migration did not evolve as an
important system of labor supply until the consolidation phase of the world capitalist
system (1981, 66). Labor migration began as a form of migration induced through force
and systematic employer recruitment (Sassen-Koob 1981,66). Eventually, migration
evolved along with capitalist penetration into peripheral areas in a process of self-induced
selection (Portes and Bach 1985, 53). Portes and Bach assert that the present form of
immigration has become a self-propelled flow in which agencies of the state are used to
regulate an ever-present supply of immigrants (1985, 53).
In the United States, the state serves a dual purpose: to promote and assist in the
accumulation of capital and to resolve conflicts within the society (Bach 1978, 540). In the
case of international migration, the state resolves conflicts between citizen labor and
immigrants while simultaneously protecting the interests of employers in the accumulation
of capital. This dual function presents a dilemma for the state in general and for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Border Patrol in particular.
Sassen-Koob describes the dilemma:
The enforcement of national borders contributes to the peripheralization of a part
of the world and the designation of its workers as a labor reserve. Border
enforcement is a mechanism facilitating the extraction of surplus labor by assigning
criminal status to a segment of the working class--the illegal immigrants. Foreign
workers undermine a nation's working class when the state renders foreigners
socially and politically powerless. At the same time, border enforcement meets the
demands of organized labor in the receiving country insofar as it presumes to
protect native workers. Yet selective enforcement of policies can circumvent
general border policies and protect the interests of capital sectors relying on
immigrant labor. This shows the contradictory role of the state in the accumulation
process.... (Sassen-Koob 1981, 70)
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This process and the contradictory role of the state is reflected throughout IRCA The
state cannot totally stop the flow of undocumented immigrant labor and at the same time
protect the interests of employers. Consequently, while the goal of Section 274A is to stop
the flow of undocumented immigration, Sections 245A, 216, and 210 guarantee a reserve
pool of cheap immigrant labor.
On another level of analysis, Sections 245A and 210 were promulgated in order to
create a marginal group of new immigrant labor with criminal status. Those who do not
qualify for these "amnesty programs" will be forced further outside the margins of society.
Moreover, the loopholes in the employer sanctions provisions will increase this "rapidly
growing sub-stratum of new illegals" (Portes 1978, 482).
A CRmQUE OF IRCA
After analyzing IRCA from the alternative theoretical perspective outlined above, it
is my contention that IRCA cannot and will not work because of the contradictory roles of
the U.S. state, especially the INS and the Border Patrol, in stopping the flow of
undocumented workers while guaranteeing employers a reserve pool of cheap immigrant
labor. The provisions of IRCA clearly illuminate this contradiction.
On another level of analysis, IRCA reveals the "hidden agenda" of creating a new
group of powerless illegal immigrant workers who occupy an even more precarious
position. The loopholes in the employer sanctions provisions and the stringent eligibility
requirements for legalization create a new substratum of undocumented workers who are
vulnerable to exploitation. Let us now consider how IRCA relates to the four stages of the
migration process.
The Origins or Causes of Migration
Section 274A, the employer sanctions provisions, assumes that such sanctions will
stop the flow of undocumented immigration and eliminate the opportunity for employment
in the United States for undocumented immigrants already in residence. This assumption
stems from the failure to consider the real cause of Mexican immigration--the economic
imbalances between the United States and Mexico. As long as such imbalances exist,
Mexicans will find a way to enter the United States. Not surprisingly, the evidence
indicates that IRCA has not stopped the flow of undocumented Mexican immigrants. 17
Because immigrant labor is a structural element connected with maintaining the world
capitalist system (Alba 1978, 509), fining employers will not change the structural dynamics
that create both the supply and the demand for cheap foreign labor.
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Stability of Migrant Flows
Section 274A assumes that the state can stop the flow of an institutionalized pattern
of migration. Yet the Border Patrol and the INS cannot stop the flow of Mexican
immigrant labor because an intricate networks enable undocumented Mexican immigrants
to continue to gain entry to the United States and find employment. The Reverend Rick
Mattey describes one such network in which undocumented Mexicans cross near EI Paso
and go north to destinations as far away as Chicago and New York. In his opinion, IRCA
will pull undocumented workers further into the U.S. interior, where the INS and Border
Patrol are less active. 18
Such networks become stable over time and can resist fluctuations in economic and
political conditions. Once in place, they are difficult to eliminate through sporadic
attempts. Such an undertaking would require widespread effort and huge outlays of
resources.
Moreover, completely stopping the flow of Mexican immigrant labor would contradict
half of the state's dual function. When U.S. public concern over the entry of
undocumented workers mounted, Congress passed employer sanctions yet guaranteed
employers a steady flow of immigrant labor by passing Sections 245A, 216, and 210. Those
who drafted IRCA assumed that these provisions would encourage legal immigration and
help stop the flow of undocumented labor while employer sanctions were reducing the
opportunities for undocumented workers.
This argument is inadequate in two respects. First, loopholes in the employer
sanctions provisions and the legalization programs limit their effectiveness (as will be
described in the next section). Second, while the legalization, H-2A, SAW, and RAW
programs do increase the supply of immigrant labor with legal status, it makes little
difference to an employer whether an immigrant worker is undocumented or legal. One
reason employers hire either category of immigrant workers is that they are powerless. As
Sassen-Koob points out, "if we only consider wages, immigrants are not necessarily that
much cheaper than low wage national workers; it is their powerlessness which makes them
profitable" (Sassen-Koob 1981, 72).
Thus Sections 245A (general legalization), 216 (H-2A), and 210 (SAWs and RAWs)
all provide employers with legal, but relatively powerless, immigrant workers. While these
workers have legal rights in the United States, they are reluctant to pursue them for fear of
retribution or deportation (see Chapter 5, note 11). In terms of the stability of migrant
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flows, Sections 216 and 210 represent an attempt to guarantee the flow of cheap immigrant
workers to the United States.
Section 216 enhances the flow of immigrant labor by streamlining the legal
requirements for importing temporary agricultural workers. H-2A workers, however, are
tied to one employer for the duration of their labor contract. Thus while these workers are
"legal," they remain cheap, docile labor,19 Section 210 facilitates employers' hiring foreign
agricultural workers by making SAW provisions less stringent than the 245A legalization
program. And if some SAWs decide to leave their agricultural jobs, as the evidence
predicts, the U.S. Congress has guaranteed employers a supply of replenishment
agricultural workers, or RAWs.
The Uses of Immigrant Labor
Section 274A contains gaping loopholes that make it a symbolic and unenforceable
law.20 One effect of these loopholes is to create a new marginal group of powerless
undocumented workers. Those applicants who do not meet the stringent legalization
requirements will join the growing substratum of "criminal" immigrants. I will now examine
the loopholes in Section 274A and the effect of Section 245A eligibility requirements on
the uses of immigrant labor.
The first loophole in IRCA's employer sanctions provisions is the stipulation that
employers must "knowingly hire" undocumented workers to violate IRCA regulations.
Employers are not required to verify the authenticity of a prospective employee's
documents but simply to certify on the form 1-9 that they saw the employee's documents
and that, to the best of their knowledge, the documents appeared to be genuine. 21
Thus employers can fall back on the affirmative defense that they completed the 1-9
in good faith without "knowing" that any employee was illegal. To respond, the government
would have to rebut this defense and somehow prove that the employer knew that the
employee was in the country illegally at the time of hire, or any time after hire. This
approach would require the U.S. government to prove the employer's subjective intent, that
is, to determine what was actually going through the employer's mind when he or she
completed the 1-9. Needless to say, the government will have difficulty in meeting this
burden of proof, leaving the employee to bear the brunt of the law.
A second loophole gives employers three days from the date of hire to complete the
1-9. Under this loophole, employers can "hire" an undocumented worker, let him or her
work for three days, then dismiss the worker at the end of the third day. This provision
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could lead to abuses of employees and thus exacerbate the precarious nature of temporary
employment of undocumented workers. Due to the worker's undocumented status, he or
she has limited legal recourse against potential abuses (see Chapter 5, note 11). If a
prospective employee does not have the necessary documents, he or she has up to twentyone days to provide them. This provision too could lead to temporary employment abuses.
Another loophole requires the INS to give three days' advance notice prior to visiting
employers to check for 1-9 violations. Thus with the exception of an INS raid (which would
be illegal under IRCA regulations), employers would have three days to either complete
the 1-9s or dismiss undocumented workers before the inspection. Moreover, workers fired
on the day of an INS inspection have no legal recourse. 22
Undocumented workers employed prior to 6 November 1986 are exempt from the
law. But these "grandfathered" employees must stay with the same employer and are
therefore subject to that employer's demands. If a worker wishes to change employers or
quits his or her job, he or she must provide proof of authorization to work in the United
States. Such a worker, who is still "illegal" according to the INS, could not get another job
without fraudulent documents if he or she fails to apply or is ineligible for legalization. 23
This situation increases "grandfathered" employees' vulnerability to abuse and exploitation.
Employers of seasonal agricultural workers are given preferential treatment under
IRCA. These employers were not required to complete the 1-9 until 1 December 1988.
Prior to this date, the INS only "urged" agricultural employers to complete the 1-9.
Meanwhile, the INS cannot enter the fields to inspect workers' documents without the
employer's permission or a search warrant. Thus a grower could dismiss undocumented
workers prior to granting the INS permission to enter the fields. 24
Section 274A contains a final loophole that allows the recruitment of foreign workers.
Under Section 274A(i)(b), a recruiter may sign up foreign workers if he or she reasonably
believes that a shortage of domestic workers exists. This provision allows recruiters to
circumvent the Department of Labor's determination regarding domestic worker shortage
and provides the means for maintaining a reserve pool of foreign labor.
In the final analysis, it is employees--not employers--who will bear the brunt of IRCA
regulations. Employees must verify their authorization to work under penalty of perjury,
while employers are merely required to inspect documents for a reasonably genuine
appearance. Employer sanctions therefore will not effectively stem the practice of hiring
undocumented workers as long as the workers' papers appear to be legal.
The INS has stated that it will hold employers to a reasonableness standard--that is to
say, employers will not be sanctioned if employees' documents reasonably appear to be
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genuine. This provision opens the door to fraud. Employers are not trained to recognize
the authenticity of documents like driver's licenses, voter registration cards, birth
certificates, or social security cards. Prospective employees can easily obtain and offer
falsified drivers' licenses and social security cards to satisfy verification requirements.
The use of fraudulent documents presents a problem in effectively enforcing
employer sanctions. If the employee presents a fake document that reasonably appears to
be genuine, the employer must simply inspect it and certify that he or she saw the
documents. Employers and employees are not required to keep their employment
verification documents on hand. Therefore the INS would have to find out that an
employee is undocumented through some means other than the 1-9.25
Research has shown that using falsified documents for employment purposes is
common in the undocumented community. According to Wayne Cornelius, 41 percent of
undocumented workers interviewed in the San Diego area since 6 November 1987
admitted purchasing or using falsified documents in order to gain employment. This figure
could be conservative because, according to Cornelius, undocumented workers generally
prefer to avoid using bogus documents and thus would be reluctant to admit doing so
(Cornelius 1988b, 27).
Section 245A was intended to be the "humanitarian" provision of IRCA Congress
intended that the legalization program be implemented in a "generous, liberal fashion."26
Yet the law and its implementing rules and regulations were promulgated in such a way
that many undocumented workers can never qualify. The plight of these workers is worse
than before because fewer employers are hiring undocumented workers for long-term
employment. This outcome is evident from the problems that potential applicants have
encountered with the program. The most serious problem has been the documentation
requirement. Many undocumented workers have not kept the necessary records (check
stubs, rent receipts, and income tax returns) to establish a prima facie case of eligibility.
According to Catholic Social Services of Albuquerque, caseworkers have had to turn down
many applicants for lack of documentation. Although applicants with insufficient
documents were told to come back, many never returned. Of some ten thousand
participants in Catholic Social Services legalization workshops at the beginning of the
program, only two thousand completed the application process at that agency.27
Other problems include the cost of filing an application, travel time, and distance. In
New Mexico, some applicants had to travel 150 to 200 miles to file legalization papers.
Some potential applicants were unable to make the trip from rural areas to the
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Albuquerque legalization office. Others could not take time off from work to file
applications. Although it was not obligatory to have an attorney prepare and file
legalization applications, some attorneys charged legalization applicants fees ranging from
five hundred to one thousand dollars for their services.28 Other potential applicants could
not afford even the basic fees for filing and medical examinations.
Finally, many potential applicants did not file applications because they lacked
accurate information. For example, rumors spread within the Albuquerque community
that persons who had received public assistance would be ineligible for legalization. Yet
only certain forms of public assistance, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), would actually disqualify a potential applicant. Those who received public cash
assistance or were excluded because of felony or misdemeanor convictions were denied
legalization.
For undocumented Mexicans who are ineligible for legalization or fail to apply for
the program, only two alternatives remain: staying in the underground undocumented
working class or returning to Mexico to scarce jobs and limited opportunities. The
evidence thus far shows that while some have returned to Mexico, many have chosen to
stay in the United States.29
Families with members who are ineligible face the possibility of deportation. While
the "family fairness doctrine" may cover a child or ineligible spouse, when that child
reaches the age of eighteen and enters the labor force, he or she will still be undocumented
and vulnerable to exploitation. Moreover, under the family fairness doctrine, the INS can
deport ineligible family members, a considerable hardship for families. 30
One final problem with the legalization program is the requirement that each
temporary resident complete the second phase to obtain permanent residency. All
applicants must provide an additional fee for filing the second-phase application, plus
medical fees (if applicable) and testing fees. The total would exceed one hundred dollars
for an individual and three hundred dollars for a family.
Some temporary residents will not be able to pass the English and civics
requirements. Although the final rules exempt persons under fourteen or over sixty-four,
many others will not be able to attend the necessary number of course hours. The INS
requires that the applicant show a proficiency in English and U.S. civics. Yet according to
final rules, those who choose to take classes to complete the second phase need only show
progress. This discrepancy could create an inconsistency in INS policy if local INS officials
call for proficiency while the regulations require only that the applicant show progress,31
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Others may simply fail to apply for permanent residency due to confusion regarding
the time frame for filing second-phase applications for adjustment to permanent residency.
If the temporary resident fails to file a timely application for any reason, he or she loses
temporary residency status and becomes deportable.
In addition to fostering a growing substratum of criminal immigrant labor, IRCA also
creates a new reserve pool of legal immigrant labor through the legalization program and
Title ill provisions for temporary immigrant workers. The H-2A provisions increase this
pool of legal immigrant workers.
As noted, Section 216 offers growers a source of powerless, cheap labor. The H-2A
program does so in two ways. First, immigrant workers are available on demand, while the
sending community bears the costs of subsistence reproduction. In the case of Mexican
immigrant labor, Mexico bears the costs of feeding, clothing, and raising children to
become workers while U.S. employers take advantage of this subsidy. Second, H-2A
workers are tied to one employer. If a worker has a disagreement with that employer, the
latter can simply fire the worker, call the INS, and petition for another immigrant worker.
The employer could even file such a petition before the worker quits or is fired, thus
minimizing slack time between workers.
A related problem is that H-2A provisions cover only immigrant workers in the
agricultural sector, thus excluding the increasing number of Mexican immigrant workers
who are employed in light-industry and service sectors (see Cornelius 1988b, 18). If
employers face a shortage of workers in these sectors, they would have to pursue the slower
channels under H-2 provisions, hire an undocumented worker for short periods of time, or
hope to hire a SAW who is eligible to change jobs. Either way, employers can obtain cheap
laborers who have limited access to legal protections.
Finally, Section 210 guarantees the future supply of immigrant labor by making the
eligibility requirements for SAW status less stringent than the rest of the legalization
program. These lax requirements encourage fraudulent applications from immigrants who
have never worked in agriculture before (see Cornelius 1988b, 27). Those who qualify can
leave the agricultural sector after one year in the fields, but the RAW program essentially
guarantees U.S. employers a similar reserve pool of powerless immigrant labor.
Adaptation 12 the Host Society
The legalization programs were designed to encourage the assimilation of qualified
applicants. 32 Those who pass the second-phase English language and U.S. history and
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civics requirements are expected to assimilate into the mainstream society. Such an
assumption is debatable, but in any case, it completely fails to take into account the dismal
prospects of assimilation for those who "fall through the cracks" of the IRCA provisions.
Those who fail to qualify for legalization and recent arrivals are either taking
temporary jobs or using false documents to obtain permanent employment. They are
ineligible for basic social services such as public housing and are discouraged from
integrating into mainstream society. Yet contrary to the predictions of some experts, these
individuals are not returning to Mexico in large numbers. Most seem to be "waiting it out"
while the rest of U.S. society ignores them.33
As for legalized residents, IRCA prolongs their marginalization by denying them
social services for five years. Those who are eligible for temporary resident status under
Section 245A are denied access to AFDC, Medicaid, and food stamps for five years.
SAWs, in contrast, are eligible for all social services except AFDC.34 These provisions
encourage SAW applications and discourage general legalization applications, a bias that
guarantees a steady supply of agricultural workers while increasing the marginalization of
those who qualify for temporary residency under Section 245A. Furthermore, those
legalized under Section 245A are ineligible for legal services (see Interpreter Releases
66: 157), a rule that keeps yet another group of immigrants marginal. Meanwhile, most
immigrant workers are paying into public funds for these services via income taxes, gross
receipts taxes, and other kinds of withholding from wages (see Chapter 2, note 39).
CONCLUSION
Analyzing IRCA from an alternative perspective illuminates the dual function
performed by the state in protecting the interests of employers while mediating conflicts
within society. From this perspective, the loopholes in Section 274A and the contradictory
provisions under Sections 254A, 216, and 210 become evident. It also becomes clear that
the United States cannot stop the flow of immigrant labor nor is it in the country's interest
to do so. These contradictions create a new category of criminal immigrant labor subject to
employer abuses.
Nevertheless, the INS insists that IRCA is working on local and national levels.
Citing reductions in border apprehensions, INS officials argue that employer sanctions are
helping stop the flow of undocumented workers. But although fewer border apprehensions
may have resulted partially from the passage of IRCA, many other factors are also
involved: an increase in INS and Border Patrol enforcement practices in the U.S. interior;
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the number of 245As and SAWs who return to Mexico less frequently since IRCA was
enacted; the severe drought of 1988, which created a surplus of unneeded agricultural
workers in the United States; and the rise in permanent migration due to restrictive
immigration policy.
One argument made by the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR) is
that it takes time for employer sanctions to work. FAIR Assistant Director Patrick Burns
insists that employer sanctions in European countries are now working after three or four
years. He believes that IRCA will follow the European pattern: "Just as U.S. employers
divested themselves of child labor in the 1930s over several years, so will they divest
themselves of illegal immigrant workers."35
Unfortunately, Burns's analysis is faulty in two respects. First, he fails to take into
account the fact that U .S. employers had immigrant labor to rely on while "divesting"
themselves of child labor. Moreover, in some cases, employers have hired immigrant
children in violation of the very child-labor law that he cites. Second, although Burns
seems to suggest that the United States will emulate European laws, European countries
will be repealing their employer sanction laws in 1992 in favor of a common market of
goods and services. Thus workers in Europe will soon be able to cross international
borders freely.36
Contradicting the INS and FAIR perspectives are other analysts on both sides of the
border who argue that IRCA is not stopping the flow of Mexican undocumented workers
into the United States. Wayne Cornelius found a significant deterrent effect operating
during the first twelve months of the law. But more recent data from the INS and El
Colegio de la Frontera Norte indicate that "beginning last December [of 1987], illegal
entries at the U.S.-Mexican border began to exceed the previous year's levels" (Cornelius
1988a, 19). Cornelius adds that sending communities in Mexico became "virtual
ghosttowns" in May 1988. Residents who remained in Mexico affirmed that "more migrants
came to the U.S. from these communities in 1988 than in any previous year" (Cornelius
1988a, 19). Cornelius's research indicates that new arrivals rely on relatives and casual
day-labor to survive.
Jorge Bustamante's findings concur with Cornelius's assertion that IRCA is not
working. Researchers at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana have observed areas
where undocumented workers cross into the United States. Their findings indicate that
IRCA has not significantly affected the number of persons crossing the borders illegally
every day (Bustamante 1978, 1988).
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The most convincing evidence that IRCA is not working to stop the undocumented
flow is found in the number of Border Patrol and INS apprehensions in March 1989. Local
authorities apprehended 126 undocumented immigrants in Albuquerque during the first
week of March. 37 At the national level, immigration agents apprehended 206
undocumented immigrants in airports across the country during the same period. 38 These
figures substantiate the continued flow of undocumented immigrants well after IRCA took
effect.39
Meanwhile, the Bush administration is planning to dig a ditch between Tijuana and
San Diego in an attempt to stop vehicles that are "smuggling aliens and narcotics."40 This
latest example of the U.S. government's unilateral approach to policy-making has been
characterized as "opening a new wound" in the already strained relations between the
United States and Mexico.41
One might argue that the real impact of IRCA can be perceived in return migration
by Mexicans who could not find jobs in the United States after IRCA took effect. A report
by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) dated February 1988 indicates that
Mexico has not experienced the anticipated "flood" of workers returning to join its labor
force. On the contrary, the impact of IRCA on Mexico in this regard appears thus far to
have been minimal.
Similarly, social services employees in Denver reported that as many as fifteen
thousand undocumented persons have stayed in the Denver metropolitan area to "wait out"
the employer sanctions. 42 These workers seek temporary employment in groups so that
one member can keep watch for the INS. Others workers around the country have become
"trapped" in the United States by debts and a lack of resources to fund the trip back to the
border. One might ask why they do not turn themselves into the INS for free
transportation to the border. The answer is that these workers have nothing to return to in
Mexico: no jobs, no opportunities, and no future. They remain in the United States in
hopes of being able to send some money back to their families in Mexico.
This "substratum" of powerless immigrant workers is beneficial to employers, but it
runs counter to the interests of the larger society in denying immigrant workers access to
basic social services and legal representation. The next chapter will outline the changes
that are advisable if the U.S. government wants to deal effectively with the immigrant flow
that it has encouraged and partially created.

CHAPTER 5: AN ALTERNATIVE POllCY PROPOSAL
The legislative history of IRCA includes a statement that identifies two causes of
undocumented immigration to the United States: ''The primary reason for the illegal alien
problem is the economic imbalance between the United States and sending countries,
coupled with the chance of employment in the United States."l As has been shown,
however, IRCA directly addresses only the second issue and virtually ignores the first. 2
Any policy directed toward Mexican labor migration should address the issues on
both sides of the border. As former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall stated, "Ultimately,
the problem of Mexican immigration to the United States will be solved by equalizing
Those
economic conditions on both sides of the border" (Marshall 1978, 163).
convinced of this necessity have suggested a variety of policy options that authorizing a new
temporary worker program, creating a bilateral institution to exchange information with
Mexico on immigration, creating a separate U.S. government agency to deal with Mexico
on various bilateral issues including immigration, and creating a common market with open
borders. While all these proposals have their merits, they also have their drawbacks.
Authorizing a new temporary worker program would still be approaching the issue
unilaterally by addressing the needs of U.S employers but not those of Mexican labor.
Creating a bilateral institution for exchanging information would likely accomplish little
toward reaching a solution to undocumented immigration, and creating a separate U.S.
agency would be expensive. Creating a common market with open borders might be
acceptable to both sides someday, but only if the benefits of such a policy did not accrue
solely to the United States}
Jorge Bustamante, a leading authority on Mexican migration to the United States,
suggests that the United States should negotiate with Mexico in an effort to reach a
bilateral treaty on the issue of Mexican immigrant labor in the United States. 4 The
parameters of such an agreement could include provisions regarding the human rights and
working conditions of Mexican workers, the length of their stay, and the conditions of their
return to Mexico. While such a pact might appear to be a throwback to the old bracero
agreements, it would differ in three major ways: it would cover all workers in all
employment sectors, not just agriculture; it could stress the needs of both countries, not just
the United States, by placing both countries on an equal negotiating plane; and it would
strictly enforce human rights and working conditions of immigrant laborers. Such an
agreement would cover only temporary labor migration, however, because as Bustamante
stresses, Mexico will not accept the idea of permanent migration to the United States.5

50
Given the population projections for both countries and IRCA's inadequacies, the
time is ripe for a bilateral approach to the issue of Mexican migrant labor. It is now in the
best interests of both the United States and Mexico to negotiate a comprehensive
agreement on Mexican immigrant workers in the United States. If the United States
continues its course of militarizing the southern border, the country could pay considerable
long-term costs for helping foment political instability and social unrest in Mexico.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
This chapter will first discuss the implications of legalizing the Mexican immigrant
work force and then propose some changes in U.S. immigration policy designed to
implement such an agreement. Emphasis will be placed on qualitative and quantitative
controls and methods for promoting economic development in sending communities.6
Legalization of All Mexican Immigrant Workers
If the U.S. government genuinely wants to stop the flow of undocumented workers,
the first step it must take is to legalize the flow of Mexicans who genuinely desire to work
in the United States.7 This goal could be accomplished by statutorily creating a separate
category for Mexican nonimmigrant workers, which could be called "H-2M" (a modification
of the existing category of H-2s, temporary workers admitted during times of domestic
shortage). Creating a new category of this kind would not require a major overhaul of the
Immigration and Nationality Act but only relatively simple amendments to the INA
designed to implement a binational agreement covering Mexican immigrant workers.
The objective would be to encourage legal migration. Eliminating the criminal status
of undocumented workers would itself reduce the incentive to cross the border illegally.
Such a step would also help protect immigrant workers from potential abuses.
It should also be pointed out that all foreigners are protected by U.S. law during their
stay in the United States.8 All workers, including undocumented workers, have the right to
unionize,9 the right to sue employers or any other persons who abuse their rights, and the
right to protections under the Fair Labor Standards ActIO and the Migrant and Seasonal
Agriculture Workers Protections Act. l l
Although Mexican workers already have these rights, they generally do not take
advantage of them for fear of losing their jobs or being deported. Immigrant workers,
undocumented as well as documented, fear retribution from employers if they complain
about payor working conditions. According to Viviana Patino, an attorney for Texas Rural
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Legal Assistance (TRIA), immigrant workers are manipulated because they lack the
support to exercise their rights. 12
This lack of support derives from several factors. First, undocumented workers are
ineligible for federally funded legal services. Such individuals, who are regularly turned
down by TRIA, must seek a private attorney who will agree to take the case on either a
pro bono or a fee-generating basis.13 Second, groups like TRIA are too understaffed to
handle all the complaints, with the result being that even some legal workers see no benefit
in trying to assert their grievances through legal channels. Finally, the insecurity of being in
a foreign country adds to immigrant workers' fears of retribution. Those who immigrate
alone lack the support that their families could provide during a labor or legal dispute.
Thus although immigrant workers have rights on paper, they are limited in practice.
Legalizing the Mexican immigrant work force under a bilateral agreement would
have several implications. A "flood" of immigrants might be expected from Mexico if the
United States were to implement an open-border policy,14 The concept of an open U.S.Mexican border is not new, however, and several analysts have come to the conclusion that
it would not create a flood at the border. For example, Carl Schwarz believes that the
solution to undocumented labor lies in simply enforcing the existing Fair Labor Standards
and allowing a "natural deterrence [to take place] through the competitive forces of the
free labor market" (see Schwarz 1983,97). Sylvia Pedraza-Bailey concurs: "If the rights to
a minimum wage and to collective bargaining were extended to all sectors of the American
labor force, in particular to the agriculture and service sectors,
the migration of
Mexicans would not rise to job displacement and illegals would cease to hold an allure.
Then the play of the marketplace would more fairly decide among contenders and
excessive immigration would be checked" (Pedraza-Bailey 1985, 75). Thus if immigrant
workers were given legal status, they would compete equally in a "free" labor market. 15
Another implication of legalizing Mexican immigrant labor is its effect on wages. It
could be argued that legalization would push labor costs too high for employers to stay
abreast of foreign competitors who employ cheaper labor. The experience of the Arizona
Farmworkers Union, however, suggests otherwise. When employers hired workers under
collective bargaining agreements that provided for higher wages and better living
conditions, they found that in the long-run, workers were more motivated, more reliable,
and more productive. Darien Cabral summarizes the result of the first AFW contract
under a new collective bargaining agreement:

52
The contract ... was revolutionary. It went against decades of U.S. agriculture
policy. Over a four-year period, during which workers continued to struggle,
Martori [the grower] eventually constructed air-conditioned worker barracks with a
dining hall and recreational facilities. The workers began earning upwards of fifty
dollars per day. In return, Martori received a stable and committed work force,
whose employment at the ranch was based on seniority. Production per worker
increased dramatically, profits went up. (Cabral 1984, 6)
Thus unionization and higher wages need not spell disaster for U.S. business.
Labor unions on both sides of the border could be a key component in enforcing
workers' rights. On the Mexican side, unions could provide informational networks and
educational programs to organize workers and could plan strategies for their stay in the
United States. Meanwhile, U.S. unions could provide needed support to enforce labor laws
and help insure decent working conditions. It would be in the best interest of U.S. labor
unions to legalize and unionize the Mexican immigrant work force because doing so would
reduce employers' reliance on undocumented laborers as strikebreakers.
To summarize, a logical alternative policy is to provide legal status to all Mexican
immigrant workers. With their criminal status removed, immigrant workers would have to
compete on an equal basis with domestic workers. While the tendency would be to pay
immigrant workers less than their native counterparts receive, strict enforcement of U.S.
labor laws could check employer abuses. Indeed, during the debate over immigration law
reform, several analysts suggested simply enforcing U.S. labor laws in response to
undocumented immigration. 16 This approach would also assure Mexican authorities of the
well-being and fair treatment of Mexican nationals in the United States.
Even if an open-door policy increased Mexican immigration, the result would still be
preferable to the current situation because the flow would be legal and regulated by
quantitative and qualitative controls. Moreover, it would fit into the context of a bilateral
agreement that could promote economic development in sending communities, thus
helping reduce the economic imbalances and the incentives to migrate. The following
sections outline the provisions of such an agreement.
Quantitative Controls
Unlike the H-2Aprogram, a new "H-2M" classification would cover any Mexican
immigrant worker in any economic sector where a shortage of domestic labor exists. All

53
applicants would be required to obtain a nonimmigrant visa for entry to the United States.
This requirement would not entail a major overhaul of the INA because visa quotas do not
apply to nonimmigrants.17 Undocumented workers already in the United States would be
required to go to the nearest port of entry to obtain a nonimmigrant visa. All existing
grounds for exclusion under the INA would continue to apply.18
Second, the need for additional workers would be determined by employers, the U.S.
Department of Labor, and state employment agencies. A point system could be
implemented to give preference to those who could prove family ties or employment
opportunities in the United States. Such a policy would coincide with the family
reunification goal of the INA and would help ensure a social network to support immigrant
workers. A letter from a U.S. employer indicating the reasons for hiring a foreign worker
could serve two purposes: proving the existence of employment opportunity in the United
States and documenting a shortage of able and willing domestic workers.
An H-2M classification would not eliminate statutory mechanisms for controlling
temporary immigrant workers. It would adopt the regulations under the H-2A program
designed to streamline the labor certification process (see Chapter 3, notes 21-22). But this
new classification would eliminate the stipulation that workers can work for only one
employer, a requirement that can lead to employer abuses (see Chapter 4).
Qualitative Controls
Under the proposed policy, each potential migrant worker would have to
demonstrate a genuine desire and capacity to work in the United States. The worker would
have to provide written proof of employment history, experience, and skills in the visa
application. A note from a U.S. employer would also help ensure qualitative controls. The
Mexican government or an independent private agency could also participate in quality
control of immigrant workers by creating an agency that would recruit workers and oversee
all international labor contracts.
Duration of Stay
A new category of "H-2Ms" could be allowed to stay in the United States for up to
three years, if steadily employed. At the end of that period, all workers would be required
to return to Mexico. Those who had developed family ties could apply for adjustment of
status to permanent residency in the United States. But the thrust of such a program would
be to discourage permanent migration to the United States, in accordance with the views of
the Mexican government.
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Each worker would receive a temporary residency card with his or her name and a
number. A computerized registry at the border could verify whether the card had expired.
Failure to show employment history during the three-year temporary stay in the United
States would result in an order to show cause and a deportation hearing. Violation of
immigration laws, including possession of an expired temporary residency card or a serious
violation of U.S. law would have the same result.19
Workers would be free to work for more than one employer during their temporary
stay. If workers lost their jobs or wished to change jobs, they would need to contact local
immigration authorities and verify the new employment. Similarly, if an employer lost one
of these workers, the employee would have to notify the local employment agency and the
INS. These requirements would help authorities keep track of workers and their status. 20
The United States could establish community action agencies to assist new immigrant
workers in finding jobs. Such an agency would act as a "clearing house" for employers to
advertise new openings and to contact immigrant workers if domestic workers failed to fill
those jobs. New workers lacking a note from a U.S. employer or family ties in the United
States could go to the community action agency to contact employers.
A similar system already exists in the United States under the H-2A program, the
Interstate Clearance System. Growers are required to file an interstate clearance order
with the state employment commission. The state employment agency then advertises the
job opening and issues a clearance order if no native workers apply for the job.21 The
problem with the system, according to TRLA's Patino, is that state employment agencies
are not getting the word about job vacancies out to workers, whether native or foreignborn.22 A separate community agency would be more effective in this role by limiting its
service to Mexican immigrant workers. Mexican consulates could also assist in making
certain that new immigrants had job contacts. 23
Remittances
A bilateral agreement could include provisions designed to reduce the economic
imbalance between the two countries. The United States could take steps designed to
reduce such imbalances through U.S. immigration policy. It could draw on an economic
development model based on unionizing immigrant workers and establishing cooperative
funding projects in sending communities.
The Arizona Farmworkers Union (AFW) and the Cooperativa sin Fronteras (CSF)
together constitute such a model. AFW membership was about 85 percent undocumented
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workers in 1988.24 Under AFW contracts, which include collective bargaining agreements,
employers set aside twenty cents per worker per hour for an economic development fund.
These funds are divided in half, with ten cents in cash being matched by ten cents used for
the purchase of machinery. The AFW then sends the cash and machinery to the CSF, its
sister organization in Mexico. The funds are used in sending communities for grass-roots
economic development projects like irrigation systems, pig farms, tortilla factories, and
sewing cooperatives (see Conover 1985).
It is important to emphasize that these funds do not come out of workers' pockets.
Rather, employers pay into the fund. The union negotiates wages and working conditions
separate from the employers' responsibility to contribute to the economic development
fund.
U.S. employers could also assist in economic development in Mexican sending
communities by withholding social security and retirement deductions and placing them in
an economic development fund. Many Mexican workers receive no benefit from
deductions for social security and retirement nor from the taxes they pay to local
economies (see Chapter 2, note 39). Richard Sinkin, Sidney Weintraub, and Stanley Ross
have suggested that the United States could return social security and retirement
deductions to workers when they return to Mexico (see Sinkin, Weintraub, and Ross 1981).
Doing so would provide an incentive for workers to leave the United States after their visas
expire and to use these funds in Mexico. Although Mexican workers may be eligible to
receive U.S. Social Security benefits in Mexico, many do not work the necessary amount of
time in the United States to receive these benefits or do not apply.
Funds generated by the AFW-CSF model and social security deductions differ from
individual remittances. Mexico receives approximately one billion dollars per year in
remittances, but those funds mostly go to individuals and their families, seldom to
community economic development projects (see Alba 1985,289-98). Economic
development funds should be used for the community as a whole, and workers from urban
areas could send these funds to a cooperative representing their colonia, or neighborhood.
Economic development projects should be managed by the workers, or the workers'
families, with minimal outside interference. Agricultural cooperatives could emphasize
small-scale, labor-intensive agricultural production designed to increase profitability as well
as production. Urban cooperatives could emphasize labor-intensive industry. Not all
projects need be cooperatives, however. Other development projects could include public
works with limited budgets or short-term grass-roots development projects.
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The goal of all economic development projects should be to reduce Mexican workers'
dependence on employment in the United States by providing job opportunities in Mexico
for them and their families. This approach would eventually help alleviate the economic
imbalances between the two countries, thereby eliminating the key incentive to leave
Mexico for U.S. destinations.
Enforcement Mechanisms
A bilateral treaty on Mexican immigrant workers must contain adequate enforcement
provisions to protect against abuses. In Bustamante's proposal for a bilateral approach, he
suggests that the United States and Mexico form a bilateral commission "whose main
objective is to conceptualize and assess the major costs and benefits of undocumented
migration" for both countries (see Bustamante 1988b, 119-20). The commission's findings
would become the basis for formal negotiation of a bilateral agreement.
I would propose that such a commission--comprised of individuals representing the
two governments, labor, and business--should function under a bilateral agreement to
ensure compliance with treaty provisions. A bilateral commission would oversee treaty
operations and enforcement. The lack of such an entity proved to be a major problem in
the earlier bracero agreements, one that led to employer abuses.
Treaty enforcement would require channeling sufficient resources and energy to the
Border Patrol, the INS, and the legal staffs of public agencies. Employer sanctions would
remain but in a form amended to eliminate loopholes. Enforcement activities would focus
on insuring employers' compliance and legalized workers' return to Mexico. It is especially
important that immigrant workers be eligible for legal services. Such eligibility would
require sufficient allocation of funds for legal staffs to handle all claims against employers.
More staff members in government and private agencies are needed to enforce workers'
rights. 25
CONCLUSION
Put simply, Mexican immigrant labor is a ''bilateral issue that requires a bilateral
solution" (see Bustamante 1988c, 76). A comprehensive treaty between the United States
and Mexico covering temporary Mexican immigrant workers would represent the first step
toward a short-term solution. A bilateral agreement would offer a number of benefits for
both countries: it would reduce undocumented entry by allowing workers to cross the
border legally; it would eliminate the need for smugglers (or "coyotes") who often take
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advantage of those who pay to enter the United States illegally; and it would eliminate
farm-labor contractors, who also can abuse workers; A bilateral agreement would help
reduce population pressures and unemployment in Mexico; it would eliminate immigrant
workers' illegal status and strengthen their rights against employer abuses by enabling them
to compete equally for jobs in the United States; and it would provide U.S. capital with
immigrant labor to help address the projected shortage of domestic labor in low-entrylevel, low-skilled jobs. Finally, a bilateral agreement would help eliminate economic
imbalances between the United States and Mexico.
A precedent for solving problems along the U.S.-Mexico border have been
established by bilateral agreements on environmental issues (see White 1989). A treaty on
immigrant workers could be tied to other issues such as trade, foreign debt, and border
economic development. In the long run, a bilateral solution to the issue of undocumented
immigrant workers could be the first step toward a North American common market that
would serve both countries' mutual interests on an equal basis.

NOTES
Nom TO CHAPTER 1
1. Statement on United States Immigration and Refugee Policy, 30 July 1981, printed in Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Rea~an, 1981, 677.

Noms TO CHAPTER 2
1. James Nafzinger cites Alexander de Toqueville's Democracy in America in explaining how the
American public faithfully accepts the "dominant mythology" about undocumented Mexicans: "In
the United States, the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the
use of individuals, who are then relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own.
Everybody ... adopts great numbers of theories on philosophy, morals and politics, without
inquiry, upon public trust" (Nafzinger 1977, 65).

2. The modernization theory of societal development grew in popularity during the 1950s and
1960s. David Lerner, Edward Banfield, and David McClelland are noted for their work on the
sociological perspective of modernization theory (see Evans and Stevens 1987). In an effort to
modernize its economy and society during the 1950s and 1960s, Mexico adopted a developmental
strategy that reflected assumptions taken from modernization theory (see Chapter 4).
3. Portes and Bach distinguish between orthodox and unorthodox migration theories in their
chapter on orthodox theories (Portes and Bach 1985, 1-28). For a discussion of alternative
theories, see Chapter 4 of this paper. Equilibrium theory applies to the first three steps.
Assimilation theory provides the orthodox view of immigrants' adaptation to the host society but
does not include the final stage of cyclical migration, the return home. This stage has only recently
been assessed from a theoretical perspective (see Alba 1985,274).
4. Most Mexicans immigrate from the states of Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and Chihuahua
(see Portes and Bach 1985,82). Approximately 70 percent of all undocumented Mexican workers
come from towns with populations exceeding twenty thousand, and 50 percent from cities of one
hundred thousand or more (Alba 1978,504).
5. Jeffrey Passel and Karen Woodrow point out three types of immigrants: settlers (permanent
residents), sojourners (those who stay in the United States temporarily), and commuters (those
who regularly migrate on a daily basis). See Passel and Woodrow (1987).
6. Alba describes the majority of Mexican immigrants as sojourners (Alba 1985, 276; see also
Portes and Bach 1985, 80).
7. L6pez reported in 1981 that only 11 percent of Mexican immigrants become permanent U .s.
residents, contrary to the popular view that about one-third become permanent residents (L6pez
1981, 625, 677).
8. See Jenkins (1978). Known as the labor-scarcity theory, this argument traces the availability of
low-skilled workers in the U.s. labor market to "peculiar labor scarcities" characteristic of
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advanced industrial society (or the inability to secure domestic workers to do the "dirty work")
(Jenkins 1978, 516). The result is a powerful pull drawing workers from less-developed regions of
the world into more-developed countries. Immigrant workers are, according to labor scarcity
theory, a "purely supplementary phenomenon, filling jobs that are left vacant by domestic workers"
(Jenkins 1978,524).
9. In critiqueing labor-scarcity theory, Jenkins remarks that it "ignores a central feature of labor
markets, namely that such markets are a central means of structuring economic and political
relations between classes within a capitalistic society" (Jenkins 1978,524).
10. Ellwyn Stoddard describes the "us versus them" perspective in this way: "Most persons view
the illegal Mexican (hereafter IMA) problem as solely a function of the alien himself, a
pathological condition brought into our society by persons who continue to enter the United States
in violation of the law. This view not only pictures the IMA as an undesirable, but it also serves to
provide a visible scapegoat for domestic U.S. unemployment while absolving the United States and
its citizens from the blame with regard to the illegal practices [of exploiting immigrant workers] .
This self-deception enables us to overlook the forces within our own society which contribute to
the support of the IMA phenomenon even while we publicly condemn it" (Stoddard 1976, 157).
11. Statement of Ronald Reagan, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 22, nos. 153337, 6 Nov. 1986. President Reagan apparently ignored his Council of Economic Advisors, which
had earlier concluded that undocumented workers did not displace U.S. workers (see Bustamante
1988,65).
12. The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment in the
western United States directed primarily at Chinese and Japanese immigrants. Under pressure
from anti-immigrant labor groups, Congress passed the Anti-Contract Labor Law in 1885. Its
purpose was to prevent importation of cheap immigrant labor, but it was directed primarily at
Chinese and other Asian workers. This period marks the beginning of "de jure" restrictionist
immigration policy designed to cut off Asian immigration. At the same time, this "exclusionary"
policy allowed Mexican immigration to continue under a loophole in the Anti-Contract Labor Law
and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Acts (Act of 6 May 1882, 22 Stat. 58; extended in 23 Stat.
332, 25 Stat. 566, 27 Stat. 25, 32 Stat. 176, 33 Stat. 428; repealed in 1943, 57 Stat. 600). This
loophole allowed foreigners temporarily residing in the United States to continue working here,
thus providing an exemption for recruiting Mexican nationals as temporary workers (note that the
Chinese Exclusion Acts flatly barred Chinese individuals from residing in the United States).
Employers perceived Mexican workers as a convenient source of cheap labor that was easily
recruited and readily deportable when not needed (see Cockcroft 1986,35-63). The policy of using
Mexican immigrant workers as temporary laborers continued throughout the twentieth century
and has been extended under IRCA (see Chapter 4).
13. On anti-contract-Iabor provisions and the immigration head tax, which the 1917 law retained,
see White (1989, chap. 2). The new law also required that all immigrants sixteen years of age or
older be literate in their native language.
14. This provision was a temporary one designed to allow a short-term labor force during the war.
Employers were permitted to contract temporary Mexican labor under Article 4, Proviso 9 of the
19171aw. The forces underlying this provision and its implications are discussed in White (1989,
chap. 2, nn. 85-86).
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15. Three hundred thousand persons were deported to Mexico between 1930 and 1940 (see
Flores 1983, 294).
16. Portes and Bach describe the pattern of Mexican immigrant labor during this period: "More
than any other movement, Mexican immigration has followed an ebb and flow pattern, both at the
aggregate and individual levels. At the level of aggregate processes, high demand for Mexican
workers in agriculture, mining, and railroad construction gave way to a post-Depression period in
which this demand not only disappeared, but Mexicans were blamed for domestic unemployment"
(Portes and Bach 1985, 79). The same pattern exists today and will continue under IRCA (see
Chapter 4).
17. According to Portes and Bach, "A campaign of forced repatriation followed [the Depression]
in which not only immigrants, but United States-born Mexican Americans were returned to
Mexico" (Portes and Bach 1985, 79; see also de la Garza 1985, 99).
18. Although the bracero program is commonly identified with Public Law 78 of 1951, the
program began with a series of agreements between the United States and Mexico that started in
1941. These agreements continued the use of "temporary" Mexican immigrant workers.
19. Each of the above changes in the law resulted from an "immigration crisis" perceived by the
U.S. public as "a threat to the nation." Each change has fostered confusion and a mistrust of
immigrants, who in tum mistrust immigration officials. Cafferty et al. characterize U.S.
immigration policy thus: "Every new international crisis has its immigration ramifications.
Because different aspects of immigration are presented from time to time as 'the' immigration
problem, the government is encouraged to handle immigration policy piecemeal, managing each
crisis as it arises, and finally arriving at a policy that is more often than not inconsistent,
incomprehensible, and incompetent. The false impression is conveyed that immigration is out of
control, but in truth it is the policy-making process that is out of control" (Cafferty et al. 1984, 57).
20. Racism and xenophobia have been well-documented as factors contributing to restrictive
legislation during this period (see White 1989, chaps. 1-2). According to Kitty Calavita, popular
social theory played a large part in reinforcing racism and xenophobia: "Social Darwinism was a
central ingredient in anti-immigrant racism. This distortion of the Darwinian theory of evolution
and its application to the social world announced that the fittest survived and, therefore, that the
polarization of social classes was merely a reflection of inherent abilities" (Calavita 1984, 104).
Late-nineteenth-century authors spread social Darwinism by describing immigrants as "outcasts of
an imperfect race ... or degenerate offspring of an injured and defective stock" (1984, 104).
Traces of social Darwinism still exist in the United States today (see White 1989, chap. 2, n. 54).
21. For a discussion of popular assumptions about undocumented immigration, see Tiano (1988),
103-12.
22. Cockroft (1986) cites Thomas Miller, The Fourth Wave:
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1985).

California'~

Newest Immigrants

23. A widely-cited source on this question is North and Houstoun (1976). See also Bustamante
(1984) and Stoddard (1976, 166).
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24. See Zoldberg (1983); and on the impact of immigrants on earnings of youth in the United
States, see Matta and Popp (1988).
25. A total of 601,516 immigrants were admitted in 1987. The number of immigrants admitted
during the 1980s has averaged about 575,000 per year, with Mexico contributing the highest
number of immigrants during the 1980s at 538,651 per year. These figures are based on data taken
from the 1987 Immi&ration Statistics, published by the INS and the Department of Justice
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO). The number of undocumented immigrants is obviously unknown
(see White 1989, chap. 2, n. 71).
26. Braceros and undocumented laborers have been used to undermine incipient labor
organizations among domestic farmworkers throughout the U.S. South and Southwest (see Portes
and Bach 1985, 68).
27. Portes and Bach add that organized labor "did not hesitate to resort to racist agitation and
xenophobic campaigns to achieve its goals" of restrictionist immigration policy (Portes and Bach
1985,50).
28. Cardenas describes the complicated puzzle in the debates surrounding the National Origins
Quota Laws of the 1920s: "capitalists argued that Mexico was a source of cheap, abundant labor
and thus an economic asset to the country. The Department of Agriculture asserted that Mexican
labor was needed for [federal] reclamation projects; the Department of State contended that
immigration quotas on Western Hemispheric countries would adversely affect efforts at Pan
Americanism. In opposition was organized labor, which maintained that Mexicans displaced
Americans in the labor market because of their alleged willingness to work for lower wages.
Moreover, they argued that in doing so, possibilities for labor organization were thus thwarted.
Racists argued that Mexicans posed racial threats to the homogeneity of the American people
because of their biologically inferior status" (Cardenas 1975, 69). Mexicans countered that if they
lowered wages, contributed to poor working conditions, and thwarted labor's ability to organize, it
was because they lacked clout to demand union wages. As they were not allowed to unionize, they
had no choice but to work for lower wages and in poor working conditions (L6pez 1981, 662).
Ironically, the same type of debate was to take place more than fifty years later between
representatives of the same groups.
29. L6pez adds, "In the face of a post World War recession, an increasingly powerful domestic
labor movement, and mobilized restrictionist sentiment, the success of the southwestern employers
during the 1920s was remarkable. So too was their intricate and ingenious domestic strategy,
which had two goals: first, gaining federal exemptions for temporary immigrant labor, and second,
keeping the migrant labor pool large, fluid and unorganized. Employers argued that domestic
workers, despite the recession, would not fill available jobs at any wage" (Lopez 1981,658).
Proviso 9 gave the U.S. Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization discretionary power to
admit otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission to the United States.
Subsequently, the bracero program supplemented the means of admitting temporary foreign labor.
The Immigration and Nationality Act includes temporary worker provisions. Promulgated in 1952,
Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) provides for the entry of temporary workers in areas where a domestic
shortage exists. These workers are known as "H-2s." Today the H-2 provisions and undocumented
immigration serve the same purpose. Thus the same strategy described by L6pez continues today.
For further discussion on this point, see Chapter 4 of this paper.
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30. Public Law 78,65 Stat. 119 (1951)
31. A group of congressmen from Texas blocked a proposal to include employer sanctions in the
1952 INA. The Texans' successful bid to derail employer sanctions became known as the "Texas
Proviso." It exempted employers from penalties for hiring undocumented workers. Thus under
Sections 274 and 289( a )(3) of the 1952 Act, harboring, transporting, and importing undocumented
aliens were all illegal activities but hiring them was not.
32. Cardenas explains that the INS first began a concentrated effort to regulate the pool of
undocumented Mexican immigrants in 1947, when it located 182,986 persons in this category
(Cardenas 1975,81).
33. According to Edward Galarza, two major factors contributed to the implementation of
Operation Wetback: public opinion following National Farm Labor Union strikes of 1951 and
1952, which the public believed were caused by ''wetbacks"; and the success of the bracero program
in procuring temporary labor (1966, 142).
34. After the program ended, 50 to 83 percent of the former braceros eventually obtained U.S.
residency (see Rogers 1986, 204).
35. One notable exception was the International Workers of the World, or "Wobblies," which
recruited and organized immigrant workers, although they were mostly of European origin.
36. Cockcroft adds that "while the diagnosis of the cause and [labor's] perception for the remedy
were unrelated, the actual causes and potential cures for the crisis, served, intentionally or not, to
divert attention from the true problems facing the workers" (Cockcroft 1986,41).
37. See Sierra (1987), 51; and UFWv. INS, Federal Supplement, ED Ca. Civil No. 87-1064-LKK.
38. See Cockcroft (1986), 175-208. For further discussion of other groups that support and
organize immigrant workers, see White (1989, chap. 2).
39. LULAC v. INS, Federal Supplement. no. 87-4757-WDK, CD Cal., filed Dec. 12, 1987.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. This assumption is flawed in two respects. First, it contradicts orthodox theory, which argues
that immigrants take jobs vacated by domestic workers as they move up the wage and occupational
hierarchy. According to this theory, immigrants with low skills and low education cannot compete
with domestic workers. In fact, Mexican immigrants average only seven years of education (a
relatively high level of education in Mexican society) and fill "low-wage positions both in the
secondary (agriculture) sector and the low tier of the primary (industry) labor market" (Portes and
Bach 1985, 37). An increasing number of Mexican immigrants are taking low-skilled, entry-level
jobs in the tertiary (service) sector. Second, there is no evidence that domestic workers are taking
jobs vacated by undocumented workers. Studies show that following INS raids, undocumented
workers return to the same jobs. After one Southern California employer fired his undocumented
work force due to IRCA, he could not find domestic workers to take the vacant jobs (Cornelius
1988a). Evidence shows that Southern California firms relying on undocumented labor have
continued to do so after the passage oflRCA (see Cornelius 1988a).
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2. Neither the House bill (H.R. 5872) nor the Senate bill (S. 2222) included provisions to amend
the grounds for exclusion.
3. Con~essional and Administrative News 6, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), p. 5658.
4. David E. Lungren, "The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986," San Die~o Law Review 24
(1987):277-303,281.
5.8 United States Code, Sections 1101-1525 (1982).
6. See Section 274A(a)(1). Section 274(h)(3) defines an unauthorized worker as an alien not
lawfully admitted for permanent residence or one not authorized by the Attorney General to be
employed. See the third chapter of White (1989) for detailed citation of this section.
7. Employment of casual laborers, such as babysitters or those performing one-time handiwork, is
exempt from employer sanctions (see Roberts and Yale-Lehr 1986, 1-2).
8. The phrase "pattern or practice" is not defined under the act. Case law in other areas indicates
that it would apply to regular or repeated and intentional activities (see Roberts and Yale-Lehr
1986, 1-10).
9. Certain grounds of exclusion are waivable (see Reinhardt 1987,3-1 through 3-68).
10. Receipt of food stamps or Medicaid cannot be used against legalization applicants
(Interpreter Releases 64:234). According to this rule, those determined by the INS to be likely to
become a public charge are ineligible for legalization.
11. For proposed rules and regulations, see 52 Federal Rewlations 8740-8795 (1987), reproduced
in Interpreter Releases, app. vol. 64, no. 11 (19 Mar. 1987):316-74. For analysis of proposed rules,
see Interpreter Releases 64:307-15.
12. The three-day period for completing the 1-9 form and the three-day notice requirement of
INS inspection created gaping loopholes that render effective enforcement of employer sanctions
nearly impossible for the INS (see discussion in Chapter 4). For final rules, see 52 Federal
Rewlations 16, 189-16,228 (1987), compiled in Interpreter Releases 64:524-63.
13. It is still too early to determine the impact of the "knowingly hire" defense. For the results of
employer sanctions cases, see White (1989, chap. 3, n. 47).
14. The next step for restrictionist legislation is to require all workers in the United States to
carry an identification card verifying work authorization. Such a requirement could have search
and seizure implications under the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights as well as
discriminatory impact.
15. See my interview with Reverend Rick Mattey in Appendix A of White (1989).
16. The New York Times, 3 Jan. 1988, p. 1, col. 1, cited in Interpreter Releases 65:1.
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17. See Interpreter Releases 65:75, citing San Oie~o Tribune, 30 Sept. 1987, p. 1.
18. Lee v. Thornbourgh, 88 Civ. 7363 PKL (SONY), filed 17 Oct. 1988; see Interpreter Releases
65:1208.
19. Zambrano v. INS,
Federal Supplement
Aug. 1988; see InterpreterReleases 65:486, 819. -

Civil no. 5-88-455 EIB (ED Cal.), filed 9

20. See Interpreter Releases 65:819. See also Perales v. Meese, Civil no. 2265-88 (SONY), filed 1
Apr. 1988 (order 2d Cir., 4 May 1988); see Interpreter Releases 65:482-83.
21. Ayuda v. Meese, 687 Federal Supplement 650 (DOC 1988); see Interpreter Releases 65:345,
347. To be eligible for legalization, an applicant's illegal status must have been known to the
government before 1 Jan. 1982. For a discussion of developments in this case, see Interpreter
Releases 65:784, 900, 929, 958, 1012, 1131, 1260.
22. LULAC v. INS,
Federal Supplement
, No. 87-04757 (CD Cal.), filed 22 July 1987;
see Interpreter ReleaSeS64:818. An estimated one )lundred thousand potential applicants did not
apply for amnesty because of INS policy on reentry. According to a court order in the LULAC
case, persons who can prove that they were adversely affected were given until 30 Nov. 1988 to file
a late application for amnesty. Under a stipulated stay order, the INS agreed to accept
applications and to grant a stay of deportation and work authorization to affected applicants for
the duration of the court's stay. Those persons who were apprehended and might qualify for a
"LULAC extension" were issued an order to show cause for a stay of deportation. They were to be
released on their own recognizance and given thirty days to file an amnesty application. See
Interpreter Releases 65:937.
23. Catholic Social Services, Inc., v. Meese,
Federal Supplement
, Civil no. S-86-1343
CKK (ED Cal.), filed 24 Nov. 1986; revised 815 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated _ Federal2d
, no. 86-2907 (9th Cir., 15 June 1987).
24. See also Gutierrez v. lichert,
filed 28 Mar. 1988.

Federal Supplement

,no. C-88-0585 EFL (ND Cal.),
-

25. See Interpreter Releases 65:988. Applicants have two ways to meet this requirement: one is
to pass an INS examination in which the applicant must demonstrate a "minimal understanding of
ordinary English and knowledge of U.S. history and government." The other is to pursue a course
of study satisfactorily, which includes five options: completing forty hours of a recognized sixtyhour course; getting a high school diploma or general equilvalency diploma; attending at least one
year in a state-accredited school and passing at least forty hours of English, U.S. history, and
government; taking an INS-certified course; and passing a proficiency test and completing forty
hours of home study.
26. The Secretary of Agriculture is to determine which products fall under the category of
"perishable commodities" for purposes of the SAW program.
27. National Cotton Council of America v. Lyng, _ Federal Supplement _ , Civil Action no.
CA 5-87-0200C (ND Texas), filed 8 Feb. 1988; see Interpreter Releases 65:153, 178.
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28. Arizona Farmworkers Union v. INS,
(DDC), filed 23 Dec. 1987.
29. United Farmworkers Union v. INS,
LKK (ED. Cal.), filed 13 May 1988.
-

Civil Action no. 87-3475

Federal Sup,plement
Federal Su~~lement

, Civil Action no. 87-1064-

30.8 CFR 21O.3(b)(4) 1988. See Interpreter Releases 65:733.
31. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., v. Nelson,
Federal Su~~lement
, Civil Action no. 881066 Atkins (SD Florida), filed 22 Aug. 1988. See also Ramirez-Fernandez v. Giugni,
Federal Supplement __, Civil Action no. EP 88-CA 389 (WD Texas), filed 9 Sept. 1988.
32. L6pez v. Ezell,
Federal Supplement
, Civil no. 88-1825-JLI (SD California), filed 30
Nov. 1988. The INS has admitted to "improperly confiscating" 1-688A and 1-688s (verification of
temporary residency) from SAW recipients (see Interpreter Releases 66:187). The parties have
reached an agreement whereby the INS shall reinstate improperly confiscated applications.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

f

1. Considerable disagreement exists among contemporary Marxist theorists over the concept of
mode of ~roduction. Roxborough views the concept as characterizing a "totality which
encompasses as a necessary condition, relations of production and distribution of a class structure
and a set of political institutions which form a unity with the economic base" (see Goodman and
Redclift 1982, 56). Other theorists, such as Alavi and Banaji, view mode of production as "an
abstract concept which defines the laws of motion and underlying structural regularities of a social
formation, which is a specific concrete historical reality. The concepts of mode of production and
social formation, although of quite different levels of theoretical abstraction, thus coincide"
(Goodman and Redclift 1981,57). Disagreement also exists about the usage of nonca~italist and
~reca~italist modes of production. Precapitalist refers to a society that will eventually succumb to
the natural laws of motion of capital and complete the transformation from primitive forms of
accumulation to capitalist forms of accumulation. Nonca~italist refers to a society that exists
outside or alongside capitalist society. Many authors use the two terms interchangeably. The
important distinction for articulationists is that precapitalist or noncapitalist societies exist in
articulation with a dominant, capitalist society. I will use the term nonca~italist modes of
~roduction to mean the relations of production, distribution, and the economic base of a
subordinate segment of society that exists in articulation with the dominant, capitalist society.
2. One example of such imbalance is maintaining wage scales that bear little relation to costs of
consumption. During 1984 real minimum wages in Mexico equaled 1965 levels, and real average
wages equaled 1970 levels (see Casteneda 1986, 127).
3. Oligopolies are market situations resulting from large firms controlling a significant portion of
their respective markets and being able to pass on costs to consumers through their control of the
markets.
4. The informal sector consists of unregulated economic activity, such as self-employment.
5. An estimated ten million Mexicans were underemployed in 1982 (see Cockcroft 1986, 129).
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6. Fernandez adds, however, that the system that created a demand for peasant labor in the
southwestern United States already existed prior to the U.S.-Mexican War. According to
Fernandez, the landed monopolies that prevailed during the Spanish and Mexican periods changed
hands but remained largely intact during the transition from Mexican to U.S. sovereignty. After
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the economy of the Southwest was "swiftly transformed
from a feudal monopoly into a capitalist monopoly in the land" (Fernandez 1977, 95). Fernandez
characterizes this monopoly thus: "ownership of property in the means of production, e.g., land,
equipment, tools, etc., is the privilege of one group or class in the society. The other class is
dispossessed and owns no property in this particular sense. Thus the only effective ownership that
a person in the latter class can exercise is ownership over his/her own ability to labor, i.e., labor
power" (1977, 94). This transformation resulted in an "empire" of large farms, especially in
California, which employed Chinese, Japanese, Mexican, and even East Indian and Filipino
workers (Fernandez 1977, 96).
7. See Alba (1978), 507. David Goodman and Michael Redclift echo Alba's thesis, emphasizing
that policies of rapid industrialization and promotion of commercial agriculture following the
Cardenas era led to the proletarianization of campesinos in Mexico (Goodman and Redclift 1982,
186-213).
)
8. For an analysis of the Mexican peso devaluation, see Zamora (1984).
9. "Salinas Needs Quick Success with Economy," Albuquerque Journal, 1 Dec. 1988, A-9, col. 6.
10. See also the video in Spanish by Isabel Garcia Gallegos, Redes Cinevideo (1988).
11. "Bid to Modernize Mexico, Party Challenges PRI," Albuquerque Journal, 27 Nov. 1988, C-6,
col. 1.
12. "Mexican President Keeps Power, Gains Backing with Stern Tactics," Albuquerque Journal, 10
Mar. 1989, A-3, col. 1.
13. "Salinas Assumes Presidency amid Opposition Protests," Albuquerque Journal. 2 Dec. 1988,
A-6, col. 1.
14. Jorge G. Casteneda, "Salinas May Be Unable to Pay Ultimate Cost ofRis Goals,"
Albuquerque Journal, 4 Dec. 1988, B-3, col. 1.
15. See also "Salinas Assumes Presidency," Albuquerque Journal. 2 Dec. 1988.
16. For general population projections in the United States, see Schale and Willis (1988, 5-8).
17. See Cornelius (1988a, 1988b) and Bustamante (1988). Research at the University of
California at San Diego consisted of interviews with nonagricultural employers in Southern
California, recently arrived undocumented immigrants, and residents of sending communities in
Michoacan, Jalisco, and Zacatecas. Research at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte consisted of a
sequence of photographs taken in the late afternoon at Cafi6n Zapata, on the outskirts of Tijuana,
and at "El Bordo," an international "no man's land" between San Ysidro and Tijuana. This
research also included short interviews with emigrants at popular crossing points located in
Tijuana, Mexicali, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, and Matamoros.
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18. Interview with the Reverend Rick Mattey, EI Paso, Texas, 17 Feb. 1989. See also Lewis
(1979).
19. Not all H-2As are powerless. For example, those who are members of the AFW work under
contracts that include collective bargaining agreements.
20. Kitty Calavita describes how lawmakers promulgate symbolic laws to placate public concern
temporarily over a given issue. There are at least four ways to provide a symbolic resolution of
conflict: by promulgating laws with large enough loopholes to allow illegal activity to continue; by
addressing a narrow and insignificant aspect of the conflict; by failing to provide enforcement
procedures; and by failing to provide sufficient funds for enforcement (see Calavita 1984,52).
Immigration laws often display all four characteristics of symbolic laws. For example, the Foran
Act of 1885 (an anti-contract labor law) contained loopholes allowing Mexican contract labor to
continue. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which required immigration authorities to inspect each
immigrant, was impossible to enforce due to manpower shortages. According to Calavita, up to
nine thousand immigrants entered the United States each day following the 1882 Act, making it
impossible to inspect all entrants. Other symbolic immigration-laws include the Acts of 1917 and
1952, both of which allowed importation of Mexican immigrant workers. While IRCA addresses a
significant aspect of the immigration debate and provides a funding mechanism for implementing
enforcement procedures, it too contains several major loopholes.
21. A copy of the INS 1-9 form may be found in Appendix B of (White 1989).
22. In a similar loophole, IRCA exempts employers who hire domestic workers in a private home
on an intermittent or sporadic basis. This loophole allows employing undocumented maids and
other domestic workers for short periods of time and then firing them. It is conceivable that an
"undocumented domestic worker circuit" could develop in which maids and gardeners alternate
employers, thus providing employers with another pool of workers on an intermittent basis.
23. The employer is exempt from sanctions, but the worker is still undocumented. It is up to
"grandfathered" employees to apply for legalization.
24. The argument here is not that the INS should be given the right to inspect the workplace
without employers' permission. Rather, notice to employers gives those who are not complying
with IRCA the opportunity to dismiss workers prior to inspection, thus circumventing the law.
This situation increases undocumented workers' vulnerability to employer abuses and contributes
to the marginality of undocumented workers who have no legal recourse vis-a-vis employers. The
solution is not employer sanctions but legalized status of all Mexican workers (see Chapter 5).
25. For example, the INS may discover an undocumented worker's illegal status as a result of a
traffic stop. At least two notices of intent to fine that were issued in the Albuquerque area
resulted from traffic stops. In one instance, after detaining an undocumented worker for a traffic
violation, the Albuquerque Police Department called the Border Patrol to "translate" for the
arresting officer. The Border Patrol then learned of the worker's unauthorized status and mailed
letters to his employer announcing the agency's intention to inspect 1-9s. Interview with Doug
Brown, INS Director of the Albuquerque office, 9 Feb. 1989.
26. H.R. Rep. No. 682 (I), 99th Congress. 2d Session. 72, reprinted in U.~. Code Congressional
and Administrative News 6:5649-5976 (see Interpreter Releases 65:419).
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27. Interview with Pat Bonilla of Catholic Social Services, 12 Feb. 1989, Albuquerque.
28. Interview with Miguel Angel Soto Reyes, the Mexican Consul in Albuquerque, 23 Feb. 1989.
29. Studies of the Immigration Reform and Control Act'~ Impact on Mexico, General Accounting
Office NSIAD report no. 88-92BR (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1989), p. 3. According to this
report, there is no evidence of a significant change in the return flow to Mexico since the passage
ofIRCA.
30. The Reverend Rick Mattey reported that some ineligible family members have already been
deported in the EI Paso area under the family fairness doctrine. Interview, 17 Feb. 1989, EI Paso.
31. Bonilla interview, 12 Feb. 1989.
32. See 8 CFR 245a.3 (1988).
33. For example, see "New Immigration Called a Failure," Sunday Denver Post, 20 Nov. 1988, Al,col. 1.
34. See section 245A(h)(i)(B) and Section 210(f).
35. See Jay Mathews, "illegal Underclass Grows under New Law, Study Says," Albuquerque
Journal, 11 Nov. 1988, B-11, col. 1.
36. It is arguable whether European employer sanctions were ever successful (see Tiano 1988,
107-8).
37. "Train, Bus Hunt Finds 126 Aliens: Arrests Up Tenfold in City Crackdown," Albuquerque
Journal, 11 Mar. 1989, A-I, col. 1.
38. "What's News--World Wide," Wall Street Journal, 3 Mar. 1989, A-I, col. 3.
39. EI Universal de Ciudad Juarez displayed a photograph of a young family waiting to cross the
border illegally in February 1989, a common occurrence even after the passage of IRCA. For
reports on the continuing flow of undocumented immigrants, see EI Universal de Ciudad Juarez,
16 Feb. 1989, A-I.
40. "'Buried Berlin Wall' Could Stymie Traffickers and illegals," Albuquerque Journal, 26 Jan.
1989, A-I, col. 1; see also, Jorge A. Casteneda, "Who Originated Ditch Proposal?," Albuquerque
Journal, 14 Feb. 1989, A-7, col. 3.
41. Interview with Soto Reyes, 23 Feb. 1989.
42. See "New Immigration Called a Failure," Sunday Denver Post, 20 Nov. 1988.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1. U.s.. Code Congressional and Administrative News 6 (1986):5656.

2. IRCA Section 601 creates the Commission for the Study of International Migration and
Cooperative Economic Development. The commission's purpose is to "consult with the
governments of Mexico and other sending countries in the Western Hemisphere" on the effects of
immigration. While this agency represents a step toward a bilateral solution, it still takes a
unilateral approach. As Bustamante observes, "To consult with another government is not equal to
negotiating with another government" (see Bustamante 1988b, 112).
3. An exchange of information would not necessarily lead to a bilateral solution, particularly if the
United States continues to implement its immigration policy from a unilateral perspective.
Furthermore, creating a bilateral institution would be expensive and time-consuming. The
International Border and Water Commission constitutes a precedent for such a commission, but
when the option arose to use it as a model for handling other environmental issues, the United
States and Mexico ultimately signed a bilateral treaty on environmental protection (see White
1989). The recent U.S-Canadian free-trade agreement came under fire from the opposition party
in Canada for serving U.S. interests only. Any of the above proposals could work in the long term.
But in the meantime, the United States needs to find a workable, short-term solution to Mexican
immigrant labor.
4. Interview with Jorge Bustamante, 24 Feb. 1989, Tijuana, Baja California.
5. Statements made during my interview with Bustamante. Mexico may officially view permanent
emigration as a drain of human resources, but in practice, such emigration could still provide an
escape valve for militancy and social unrest. It may be therefore be in the interest of the Mexican
government to remain ambivalent. At any rate, as Bustamante points out, Mexico cannot restrict
emigration under its constitution. The most the Mexican government can do is advocate the
protection and fair treatment of its citizens abroad.
6. For other proposals regarding temporary immigrant workers, see Sinkin, Weintraub, and
Stanley (1981), app. F, 344, 346-59, and Cornelius (1981). The main flaw in the first proposal is its
unilateral approach, which fails to address the Mexican perspective and assumes that the United
States can "phase out" Mexican immigration without directly addressing the factors that motivate
Mexicans to emigrate to the United States. I have expanded on the Cornelius proposal by
discussing advisable changes in immigration law and policy in order to implement a temporary
worker program. I nevertheless differ with Cornelius in two respects: his proposal rejects the
necessity of a bilateral agreement and consequently excludes Mexicans from participating in
implementation and oversight; and his proposal fails to enumerate specific steps that the United
States can take in addressing the factors motivating emigration.
7. As noted in the introduction, Mexicans come to the United States for various reasons: to be
with relatives, to avail themselves of better educational and health services, and to take advantage
of greater job opportunities. The proposed treaty would focus on Mexican immigrant labor. The
factor underlying most emigration to the United States is the desire to attain a higher standard of
living. Any bilateral agreement would have to take this motive into account and establish ways to
help eliminate the economic disparity between the United States and Mexico.
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8. Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981); U.S. v. G6mez, 797 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1986); Castillo-Felix v.
INS, 601 F. 2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979); Foleyv. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (D.C.N.Y. 1976), affirmed
98 S.Ct. 1067.
9. NRLA v. Appolo Tire Co., 604 F. 2d 1180 (1979).
10. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat 1060, codified in 29 U.S.c. Sections 201-19 (1982).
11. P.L. 97-470, 14 Jan. 1983,96 Stat 2584, codified at 29 U.S.c. Sections 1801-72 (1982).
12. Interview with Viviana Patino, 17 Feb. 1989, EI Paso, Texas.
13. Pro bono work is free legal service; a fee-generating case involves a monetary award, of which
an attorney would usually take one-third.
14. As noted in the introduction, this paper does not directly address the current wave of Central
American immigrants seeking political asylum. Their migration results from distinct sources,
partially from failed U .S. foreign policy. This immigration "problem" revolves around the U.S.
standard of demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution to establish successful claims to
political asylum and is thus a separate issue.
15. One might argue that equal competition would spur capital flight or "runaway shops" because
of the higher costs of labor and goods. But such an argument might not prove accurate in view of
the fact that nonagricultural employers in Southern California pay undocumented workers the
equivalent of minimum wage or more (see Cornelius 1988b, 20).
16. Joaquin Avila, President and General Consul of MALDEF, testified, "We must recognize that
undocumented workers already here are subject to incredible exploitation by unscrupulous
employers. It is precisely because of their undocumented status that they are so vulnerable. But
the response to the problem is not employer sanctions. Rather, the answer lies in allocating
resources for more vigorous enforcement of our labor laws." See statement of Joaquin Avila,
President and General Consul of MALDEF before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1983; see also Portes (1983) and Schwarz (1981,
97).
17. The INA distinguishes between immigrants and nonimmigrants in INA Section 101(a)(15),
codified at 8 u.s.c. Section 1101(a)(15) (1982). Immigrants are defined as all persons who wish to
establish residency in the United States. INA Section 202(a), codified at 8 u.s.c. Section 1152(a),
limits immigrant visas to twenty thousand per year per country. Nonimmigrants are temporary
foreign workers who do not intend to establish residence in the United States. There is no limit to
the number of visas that can be issued to nonimmigrants. On the admission of nonimmigrants, see
INA Section 214, codified at 8 U.S.c. 1184 (1982); see also Alienikoff and Martin (1985, 97).
18. For the specific grounds for exclusion, see Section 212, codified at 8 u.s.c. Section 1182
(1982). Applying all grounds of exclusion would limit entry to those persons who want to work in
the United States on a temporary basis. The issue of excluding nonimmigrants on moral grounds
falls outside the scope of this paper (see Alienikoff and Martin 2985, 183).
19. For example, a felony conviction or three misdemeanor convictions could propel a person in
the proposed H-2M category into deportation proceedings. An order to show cause is a notice of
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a deportation hearing.
20. Compare with 20 C.F.R. Section 655 (1988).
21. Ibid.
22. Patino interview, 17 Feb. 1989.
23. The Mexican Consul in Albuquerque, Miguel Angel Soto Reyes, commented that although it
is not the Mexican consulates' duty to assist Mexican nationals in finding jobs, they could take an
active role in seeing that Mexican immigrant workers make contact with employers and in helping
protect workers' rights. Interview, 23 Feb. 1989.
24. For a discussion of the AFW and CSF, see Lewis (1979, 130-35), and Conover (1985, 43-52).
Don Deveroux, a journalist in the Phoenix area and cofounder of the AFW, reported that the
union's future is uncertain due to urban expansion in Maricopa county and the concomitant
reduction in farms. The life of the AFW's partner union, the CSF, is also limited to the lifetime of
the AFW. Deveroux added that infighting among CSF staff and the board of directors has limited
its success during the past two years. He nevertheless affirms that the concept of grass-roots
development established by the CSF model is sound. Telephone interview, 22 Feb. 1989.
25. Viviana Patino reported that currently, two staff attorneys at the TRLA are supposed to
cover farmworkers' claims for the entire West Texas region.
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